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Mediation and the Transformation of
American Labor Unions
Ann C. Hodges"

The decline of unionization in the United States is a phenomenon that has
been well-documented. The shift in workplace regulation from collectivization
to individual regulation has been suggested as both a cause and an effect of the
reduction in unionization. 1 This transformation from a collective contractual to
a more individual statutory regime is now undergoing another change-a return
to contractual or privatized regulation, not through unions or collective
bargaining but through alternative dispute resolution ("ADR") oflegal claims.
Scholars observing this phenomenon have bemoaned the decrease in
unionization, because of the loss of power and the loss of voice for working
Americans. Many thoughtful proposals for changes that would revitalize the
labor movement have resulted. Suggestions range from changes in the law to
changes in the structure and approaches of unions. Among the more prevalent
recommendations for legal change are more effective remedies for violations of
the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA"), mandatory arbitration of first
collective bargaining agreements, removal of restrictions on employer-initiated
or dominated employee organizations, and permitting recognition of, and
bargaining with, nonmajority unions. Other scholars have focused on changes
in union orientation and structure. Among the recommendations are providing
services to members who are not represented for collective bargaining, moving
to occupationally-based unions with a focus on professionalization and training
for the new workplace, emphasizing employee skill development rather than
career employment with one employer, and increasing collaboration with other
groups focusing on social justice.
Another branch of scholarly research has focused on the trend toward
privatization through ADR. While a large group of scholars commends the
move as creating a positive alternative to litigation by allowing interest-based
problem solving and quicker, cheaper resolution of disputes, another group
focuses on the loss of legal rights and power resulting from compulsory ADR.
Employees forced to arbitrate legal claims may lose remedies, the right to a jury
trial, and the right to consolidate claims in class actions. Arbitration may, in fact,
be more costly than litigation for some employees. Another concern vocalized
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I. WILLIAM B. GOULD IV, AGENDA FOR REFORM: THE FuTuRE OF EMPLOYMENT
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about the more informal dispute resolution of ADR is the potential for
disadvantage to less powerful groups. In response to this concern, scholars have
recently suggested the use of employee caucuses and outside social justice
organizations to represent employees in dispute resolution forums.
In a recent article, Professor Marion Crain and Ken Matheny suggest that
unions should focus not only on economic justice but also on social justice,
eliminating the artificial divide between the two. 2 To enhance this focus in the
changing workplace, Crain and Matheny urge changing the law to impose on
unions an affirmative duty to battle discrimination and allowing unions to
negotiate arbitration provisions that waive employee rights to litigate
discrimination claims. 3 They suggest that the combination of these changes
would broaden the identity of labor unions as social justice organizations.4
This Article urges an incremental step toward the goal of trade union
revitalization which incorporates the benefits of expanded identity and enhanced
dispute resolution. Unions should negotiate provisions in collective bargaining
agreements that offer mediation as an option for claims not covered by the
agreement, 5 including legal claims and other disputes such as interpersonal
conflicts or communication difficulties. Such provisions would enable unions
to make progress toward many of the goals suggested by other scholars, while
at the same time providing a voluntary option for dispute resolution that bestows
some advantages on employers, employees and unions and offers promise for
reducing the power differentials between employees and employers involved in
legal disputes.
First, the Article analyzes in more detail the changes in the workplace that
have led to various proposals for reform. Then the Article looks at the potential
for mediation of claims that do not arise out of the collective bargaining
agreement, analyzing the possible benefits from the point of view of employers,
employees and unions. Next, some of the issues and obstacles to mediation are
reviewed. Ultimately the Article concludes that the benefits of mediation
outweigh the disadvantages and that in most collective bargaining relationships
the obstacles should not prevent either negotiation of such provisions or their
successful use for at least some cases.

2. See Marion Crain & Ken Matheny, Labor's Identity Crisis, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1767
(2001).
3. Id. at 1839-45.
4. Id. at 1846.
5. Some unions and employers have negotiated provisions for mediation of
grievances arising under the collective bargaining agreement. See Peter Feuille,
Grievance Mediation, in EMPLOYMENT DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND WORKER RIGHTS IN
THE CHANGING WORKPLACE 187, 190-92 (Adrienne E. Eaton & Jeffrey H. Keefe eds.,
1999) (documenting the use of grievance mediation).
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I. THE CHANGING WORKPLACE
A. The Decline of Unionization
The changes in the workplace and in regulation of the workplace have been
documented convincingly by scholars and commentators. Unionization of the
workplace has declined from a high of thirty-five percent in 1954 to 12.9 percent
today. 6 The decline has been attributed to a multiplicity of factors including
globalization and the consequent relocation of many industries, the related
transition from an industry-based economy to a service-based economy,
employers' increasingly active opposition to unionization and the ineffectiveness
of legal regulation of employer anti-union tactics, and the changing
demographics of the workforce. 7 While some scholars view the reduction in
unionization with factual agnosticism, others have sounded alarms, suggesting
that the result is despotic corporate power, loss of a vehicle for democratic
training, and loss of voice for workers, leading to disenchantment and reduced
productivity. 8 Freeman and Rogers have documented the representation gap
between the much larger percentage of workers who desire a workplace
representative and the very small percentage who have it. 9 Moreover, as the
unionization level has decreased, the number of employees protected from unjust
discharge by union contracts has decreased, leaving more employees vulnerable
to termination at will.

6. See Press Release, United States Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor
Statistics, Union Members in 2003 (Jan. 21, 2004), available at
http://www.bls.gov/rofod/3280.pdf; see also Charles B. Craver, The Clinton Labor
Board: Continuing a Tradition ofModeration and Excellence, 16 LAB. LAW. 123, 148
(2000).
7. For discussions of union decline and the factors contributing thereto, see, for
example, CHARLES B. CRAVER, CAN UNIONS SURVIVE? THE REJUVENATION OF THE
AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT 34-55 ( 1993); GOULD, supra note 1, at 35-61; Katherine
Van Wezel Stone, The Legacy ofIndustrial Pluralism: The Tension Between Individual
Employment Rights and the New Deal Collective Bargaining System, 59 U. CHI. L. REV.
575, 579-81 (1992).
8. See, e.g., CHARLES C. HECKSCHER, THE NEW UNIONISM: EMPLOYEE
INVOLVEMENT IN THE CHANGING CORPORATION 251-52 (1996); Charles B. Craver, The
National Labor Relations Act Must Be Revised to Preserve Industrial Democracy, 34
ARIZ. L. REV. 397,401-02(1992);Paul C. Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers'
Rights to Self-Organization Under the NLRA, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1769, 1822-27 {1983).
9. See RICHARD FREEMAN & JOEL ROGERS, WORKER REPRESENTATION AND
PARTICIPATION SURVEY: FIRST REPORT OF FINDINGS (1994).
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B. The Move to Individual Rights
Along with the decline of unions, however, has come the increasing
regulation of the workplace through laws providing individual rights. 10
Antidiscrimination laws have developed increasing significance, beginning with
the Equal Pay Act' 1 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 12 continuing
with the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 13 and most recently the
Americans with Disabilities Act 14 and the 1991 Civil Rights Act. 15 Other federal
laws have provided individual rights to employees, including the Occupational
Safety and Health Act ("OSHA") in 1970, 16 the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act ("ERISA") in 1974, 17 the Employee Polygraph Protection Act
("EPPA") in 1988, 18 the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act
("WARN") in 1988, 19 the Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA") in 1993,20
and the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act ("HIP AA") in
1996.21 In addition to the growth of federal statutory law, common law
exceptions to the doctrine of employment at will at the state level have increased
exponentially in recent years. The lack of protection by union contract has led
workers to challenge terminations perceived as unjust through legal action. The
overwhelming majority of states have recognized a common law cause of action
for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy.22 Most states have also

10. See GOULD, supra note I, at 55-58; James J. Brudney, Reflections on Group
Action and the Law of the Workplace, 74 TEx. L. REV. 1563, 1571-72 (1996)
(documenting the shift in Congress's regulatory focus from collective action to individual
rights).
11. 29 U.S.C. § 206 (2000).
12. 42 u.s.c. §§ 2000e-e-17 (2000).
13. 29 u.s.c. §§ 621-634 (2000).
14. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (Supp. 2001).
15. Pub L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1074 (codified in scattered Sections of2 U.S.C.,
16 U.S.C., 29 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.).
16. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (Supp. 2001).
17. Id.§§ 1001-1461.
18. 29 u.s.c. §§ 2001-2009 (2000).
19. Id. §§ 2101-2109.
20. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (Supp. 2001).
21. Pub. L. No. I 04-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (codified as amended in scattered Sections
ofl8 U.S.C., 26 U.S.C., 29 U.S.C., and42 U.S.C.). There has also been a resurgence in
claims under some older federal statutes including the Fair Labor Standards Act
("FLSA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (2000), enacted in 1938. See Attorneys Discuss
Strategies for Bringing, Defending FLSA Collective Action Lawsuits, Daily Lab. Rep.
(BNA) No. 156, at C-1 (Aug. 13, 2002).
22. See Employment at Will: State Rulings Chart, 9A Lab. Rel. Rep (BNA) (Indiv.
Emp. Rts. Man.), at 505:51-52 (Jan. 20, 2004) (showing that forty-four states and the
District of Columbia have recognized the claim for wrongful discharge in violation of
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allowed employees to sue for breach of implied contracts with their employers. 23
Employees have also used the covenant of good faith and fair dealing to combat
terminations. 24 Additionally, various other common law causes of action have
been increasingly used in the employment setting, including defamation,
intentional infliction of emotional distress, invasion of privacy, and tortious
interference with contract. Montana passed the only statute expressly requiring
cause for termination25 and many other states have enacted statutes protecting
individual employee rights. 26
Employment and labor litigation has ballooned to a significant percentage
of the federal court docket27 and has also substantially increased in many state
courts. Employers bemoan the numerous and often overlapping legal claims
available to employees, particularly those with potential for large jury awards.
One employer response has been to move toward ADR. 28 Internal dispute

public policy).
23. Id. (showing that forty-five states and the District of Columbia have recognized
implied contract claims).
24. See, e.g., Reed v. Municipality of Anchorage, 782 P.2d 1155, 1158 (Alaska
1989); Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 374 (Cal. 1988); see also
Employment at Will, supra note 22, at 505:51-52 (showing that eleven states have
recognized the claim for breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing).
25. MONT. CODE ANN.§ 39-2-904 (2001).
26. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 44-201 (Michie 1997) (prohibiting an employer from
maintaining a black list containing names of employees for the purposes of preventing
them from obtaining employment); KY.REV. STAT.ANN.§ 351.127 (Michie Supp. 2002)
(requiring an emergency medical technician on site at every coal mine "engaged in the
extraction, production, or preparation of coal"); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 1518, § 3A
(West Supp. 2003) (requiring employers to adopt sexual harassment policies and
encouraging employers to conduct education and training sessions concerning sexual
harassment); MINN. STAT.§ 181.941 (1993) (requiring employers with twenty-one or
more employees to provide up to six weeks of unpaid leave to new parents following
birth or adoption); N.J. STAT. ANN.§ 10:5-12 (West 2002) (making it unlawful for an
employer to discriminate against prospective employees on the basis of their genetic
information or refusal to submit to genetic testing); N.Y. LAB. LAW§ 212 (McKinney
2002) (requiring growers and processors to provide safe and accessible drinking water
at all sites where farm laborers are working); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 40.1-51.4:5 (Michie
2002) (providing immunity to workers who report threatening workplace conduct).
27. See Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics, Tables 8-7 (courts of appeals) and C-2
(district courts) (Mar. 31, 2002) (showing 36,979 labor and employment cases out of
265,091 total civil cases in the federal district courts, about fourteen percent of the
caseload and 4,224 labor and employment cases out of 35,732 total civil cases in the
courts of appeals, about 11.8 percent of the caseload), athttp://www.uscourts.gov/case
load2002/contents.htrnl.
28. See Alexander J.S. Colvin, Institutional Pressures, Human Resource Strategies,
and the Rise of Nonunion Dispute Resolution Procedures, 56 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV.
375, 387 (2003) (finding based on empirical research in telecommunications industry that
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resolution mechanisms range from open door policies for any issue to mandatory
arbitration of legal claims. While many scholars applaud the move to ADR as
beneficial because of its focus on quicker, cheaper and frequently interest-based
solutions, others complain that employees are deprived of legal rights by
employers who compel them to participate in fora without the judicial
protections otherwise available.
Much of the criticism of ADR has been directed at mandatory arbitration
of legal claims. As Professor Malin has ably pointed out, the crux of the
criticism is that compulsory arbitration permits employers to contract out of
statutory compliance unilaterally. 29 Unlike voluntary post-dispute arbitration,
employees don't actually bargain for predispute arbitration systems imposed by
the employer.Jo Employers can structure the systems to shorten limitations
periods, limit remedies, avoid juries, restrict discovery, preclude employee
representation, impose substantial arbitral cost on the employee, or require use
of a non-neutral arbitrator.J 1 Even where the arbitrator is jointly chosen by the
parties, the repeat player effect might result in arbitral decisions more favorable
to the employer. J2 These concerns have led to widespread criticism of mandatory
arbitration. 33 Despite the criticism, employers continue to adopt arbitration

litigation threats are associated with the adoption of arbitration for nonunion employees
but not with adoption of peer review procedures, which are prompted by threat of
unionization).
29. Martin H. Malin, Privatizing Justice-But by How Much? Questions Gilmer
Did Not Answer, 16 OHIO Sr. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 589, 592 (2001).
30. Id. at 596-97.
31. Michael H. LeRoy & Peter Feuille, When ls Cost an Unlawful Barrier to
Alternative Dispute Resolution? The Ever Green Tree of Mandatory Employment
Arbitration, 50 UCLA L. REV. 143, 143 (2002); Malin, supra note 29, at 598-99.
32. Malin, supra note 29, at 603-05. See generally Lisa B. Bingham, Employment
Arbitration: The Repeat Player Effect, 1 EMPLOYEE Rrs. & EMP. POL'Y J. 189 (1997)
[hereinafter Bingham, Employment Arbitration]; Lisa B. Bingham, On Repeat Players,

Adhesive Contracts, and the Use of Statistics in Judicial Review of Employment
Arbitration Awards, 29 MCGEORGE L. REV. 223 (1998).
33. For criticisms of mandatory arbitration see, for example, Sarah Rudolph Cole,

Incentives & Arbitration: The Case Against Enforcement of Executory Arbitration
Agreements Between Employers and Employees, 64 UMKC L. REV. 449 (1996), Joseph
R. Grodin, Arbitration ofEmployment Discrimination Claims: Doctrine and Policy in
the Wake ofGilmer, 14 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 1 (1996), Geraldine Szott Moohr, Arbitration
and the Goals ofEmployment Discrimination Law, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 395 ( 1999),
David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big Business: Employee and
Consumer Rights Claims in an Age ofCompelled Arbitration, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 33, Jean
R. Stem light, Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Supreme Court's Preference
for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637 (1996), and Katherine Van Wezel Stone,
Mandatory Arbitration ofIndividual Employment Rights: The Yellow Dog Contract of
the 1990's, 73 DENY. u. L. REV. 1017 (1996).
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systems and the Supreme Court has endorsed arbitration of statutory claims.34
Moreover, the Court's recent ruling that the Federal Arbitration Act encompasses
employment arbitration has provided a boost to employers desiring to enforce
arbitration provisions. 35 The litigation focus has shifted from whether the FAA
applies to employment arbitration to challenges to particular arbitration
agreements. Employees resisting arbitration argue that the arbitration agreement
precludes effective enforcement of statutory rights 36 or is unenforceable based
on general contract defenses, such as duress, fraud or unconscionability. 37
Dispute resolution methods other than arbitration have been less
controversial. Nevertheless, other alternative methods have not been without
their critics. Settlement by any method may inhibit development of the law and

34. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 23 (1991) (holding
that a "claim under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 ... [could] be
subjected to compulsory arbitration . . . in a securities registration application");
Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 482-83 (1989)
(finding claims under Securities Act of 1933 arbitrable); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v.
Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 625-26 (1985) (finding statutory antitrust
claims arbitrable).
35. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001) (interpreting the
Federal Arbitration Act to apply to all employment contracts except those of
transportation workers).
36. See Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 89-92 (2000);
Paladino v. Avnet Computer Techs., Inc., 134 F.3d 1054, 1060, 1062 (11th Cir. 1998)
(refusing to require arbitration ofTitle VII claims where statutory damages unavailable);
Cole v. Bums Int') Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1468 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (interpreting
arbitration agreement to require employer to pay all arbitrators' fees in order to uphold
the agreement; finding that employees cannot be required to pay fees to enforce statutory
rights in arbitration if such fees would not be required for judicial enforcement).
37. Ferguson v. Countrywide Credit Indus., Inc., 298 F.3d 778, 784-87 (9th Cir.
2002) (finding unilaterally imposed arbitration agreement unconscionable where it
required the employee to pay half of the costs, covered claims that employees are likely
to bring but excluded those that employers are likely to bring, and contained discovery
provisions favorable to the employer); Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681,
687 (1996); Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 279 F.3d 889, 893-95 (9th Cir. 2002),
cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1112 (2002) (finding unconscionable an arbitration agreement
imposed as a contract of adhesion which limited plaintiffs statutory remedies); Hendrix
v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., No. B 153848, 2002 Cal. App. LEXIS 6598, at *9-10
(Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (finding unconscionable and unenforceable arbitration agreement
that covered claims employees likely to bring but excluded those employers likely to
bring, required employees to pay half the cost of arbitration after the first hearing day,
and allowed arbitrator to impose all costs on employees who lose claims). For an
analysis of unconscionability and arbitration, see Stephen J. Ware, Arbitration and
Unconscionability After Doctor's Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
1001 (1996).
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legal norms, particularly where a statute is relatively new. 38 Informal dispute
resolution methods do not contain some of the judicial system's safeguards that
protect litigants from bias. 39 Accordingly, persons with less power, frequently
men of color and women, may be disadvantaged in informal processes. 40 While
some scholars have cautioned against use of such processes on this basis,41 others
have suggested that alternative processes may be well-suited to members of
disadvantaged groups because of their greater focus on relationships and
resolution. 42
C. The Result of Workplace Changes

These changes in the workplace and the regulation of the workplace have
caused or exacerbated certain problems. While statutory and common law
protections have expanded, many employees' ability to access these protections
is limited. In the unionized workplace, unions provide not only representation
in contractual disputes, but often representation in legal disputes as well. In the
nonunion workplace, employees must find legal representation or represent
themselves. Pro se representation in complex legal disputes is extraordinarily
difficult. Attorneys are rarely available except to employees with financial
means, or those with very strong cases that make contingency fee representation

38. Harry T. Edwards, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or Anathema?,
99 HARV. L. REV. 668, 671-72 (1986); Owen Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J.
I 073, 1085-86 (1984); Irving R. Kaufman, Reform for a System in Crisis: Alternative
Dispute Resolution in the Federal Courts, 59 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 30 (1990); Daniel
Misteravich, The Limits of Alternative Dispute Resolution: Preserving the Judicial
Function, 70 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 37, 39-40 (1992).
39. Richard Delgado et al., Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of
Prejudice in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 1359, 1367-75.
40. See id. at 1390-99; Trina Grillo, The Mediation Alternative: Process Danger
for Women, 100 YALE L.J. 1545, 1600-07 (1991); see also Margaret F. Brinig, Does
Mediation Systematically Disadvantage Women?, 2 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 1
( 1995) (reviewing empirical evidence and suggesting that any disadvantage comes from
power differential rather than characteristics such as altruism and risk aversion, which
some suggest are associated with gender).
41. See Delgado et al., supra note 39, at 1387-91; Grillo, supra note 40, at 160710.
42. See generally Isabelle R. Gunning, Diversity Issues in Mediation: Controlling
Negative Cultural Myths, 1995 J. DISP. RESOL. 55; Eve Hill, Alternative Dispute
Resolution in a Feminist Voice, 5 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 337, 338, 370-76 (1990).
See also Deborah M. Kolb & Linda L. Putnam, Through the Looking Glass: Negotiation
Theory Refracted Through the Lens of Gender, in WORKPLACE DISPUTE RESOLUTION:
DIRECTIONS FOR THE TwENTY-FIRST CENTURY 231, 231-57 (Sandra E. Gleason ed.,
1997); Kate McCabe, Comment, A Forum/or Women's Voices: Mediation Through A
Feminist Jurisprudential Lens, 21 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 459 (2001).
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financially feasible. 43 While attorneys' fees are awarded under many statutes
when the employee prevails, a lawyer will be willing to risk representation only
in a case that appears very strong. 44 While some statutes hold potential for
representation by a government agency, the overworked, underfunded agencies
accept a limited number of cases for litigation. 45 Accordingly, many employees
simply lack the means to enforce their statutory rights.
As set forth above, many employers have responded to the proliferation of
legal rights by mandating use of ADR. Most of the same representational
concerns are present. While some have suggested that arbitration may provide
a low cost alternative for employees to enforce their rights,46 there has yet to
develop a legal bar or other source of relatively low cost representation for
employees in the alternative forum. Indeed, the plaintiffs' bar has been a strong
opponent of arbitration, fearing a move to an unlevel playing field with limited
remedies and attorneys' fees. 47 Evidence suggests that where one party has an
attorney and the other does not, the party with the attorney is more likely to
prevail. 48 Moreover, despite its reputation as a less expensive forum, arbitration

43. Lewis L. Maltby, Private Justice: Employment Arbitration and Civil Rights,
30 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 29, 58 (1998).
44. Id.
45. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b)-(c), (f) (2000) (establishing the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission's ("EEOC") duty to investigate charges and file litigation
where necessary). In 2001 the EEOC filed 430 lawsuits alleging employment
discrimination in violation of statutes such as the Americans with Disabilities Act of
1990, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, and the Equal Pay Act of
1963. See U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, EEOC Litigation
Statistics, FY 1992 to FY 2001, at http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/litigation.html (last
modified Feb. 6, 2003).
46. See Samuel Estreicher, Saturnsfor Rickshaws: The Stakes in the Debate over
Predispute Employment Arbitration Agreements, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 559,
562-63 (2001) (arguing that most employees will be better off in arbitration); Theodore
J. St. Antoine, The Changing Role of Labor Arbitration, 76 IND. L.J. 83, 91-93 (200 I)
(suggesting that arbitration with appropriate protections for employees may be "the most
realistic hope of the ordinary blue-or pink-collar claimant").
47. See Brief for National Employment Lawyers Association, EEOC v. Waffle
House, 534 U.S. 279 (2002) (No. 99-1823); Brief for National Employment Lawyers
Association, Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001) (No. 99-1379);
Brief for National Employment Lawyers Association, Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v.
Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000) (No. 99-1235); Cliff Palefsky, The Civil Rights Struggle
of the '90s: From 'Separate but Equal' to 'Just Another Forum', THE RECORDER, May
1999, at S35.
48. Data demonstrates that employees who are represented in unemployment
compensation proceedings are more likely to be awarded benefits. Rick McHugh, Lay
Representation in Unemployment Insurance Hearings: Some Strategies for Change, 16
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 865, 866 (1983) (citing the 1979 study by National Commission
on Unemployment Compensation). Where employers used attorneys and employees had
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can actually cost more than litigation because the arbitrator charges fees while
the judge does not. 49
The decline of unionization has weakened the labor movement as a whole.
While there is debate about the cause and effect relationship, there is no doubt
that the labor movement is less powerful than in the past when more of the
workforce was unionized. If a union cannot organize all of the major employers
in an industry, it is difficult to sustain high wages and benefits for unionized
employees. In addition, the unions' political power is reduced because they have
less money and fewer voting members. It has been many years since unions have
been able to obtain any significant legislative victories which directly affect
unions, in contrast to the workforce in general. 50 The strike, long thought to be

no representation, the employees' success rate in obtaining unemployment compensation
was thirty percent, but where both parties were represented the employees' success rate
improved to fifty percent. Ann C. Hodges, The Preclusive Effect of Unemployment
Compensation Determinations in Subsequent Litigation: A Federal Solution, 38 WAYNE
L. REV. 1803, 1830 n.138 (l 992)(citing a 1979 study). In a study of discharge cases in
arbitration, Block and Stieber found that where one party was represented by an attorney
and the other was not, the party with legal representation had a greater chance of
prevailing, but the odds of prevailing were the same where either both or neither were
represented. See Richard N. Block & Jack Stieber, The Impact of Attorneys and
Arbitrators on Arbitration Awards, 40 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 543, 548, 553 (1987).
Some employment arbitration systems provide that if the employee foregoes legal
representation, the employer will do so as well. JOHN T. DUNLOP & ARNOLD M. ZACK,
MEDIATION AND ARBITRATION OF EMPLOYMENT DISPUTES 83 (1997) (describing
arbitration policies of The Travelers Group and Brown & Root). Others fund some
portion of the employee's legal fees. Id. (describing arbitration policies of Brown &
Root and ITI). Such features offer employees greater potential for access to justice.
49. See LeRoy & Feuille, supra note 31, at 164-65 (noting that arbitration costs can
be higher than the cost of litigation in some cases, but also pointing out that the forum
and arbitrator fees may be balanced by other costs that are relatively cheaper in
arbitration). The lower cost often comes from more limited discovery, which may
disadvantage employees who have Jess access to information than the employer, and the
decision not to use legal representation, write briefs or transcribe the proceedings. Id. at
162. But see Samuel Estreicher & Matt Ballard, Affordable Justice Through Arbitration:
A Critique ofPublic Citizen's Jeremaiad on the "Costs ofArbitration", 57 DISP. RESOL.
J., Jan. 2003, at 8, l 0.
50. No major amendments to the NLRA have been enacted since 1959. In 1977,
a major reform effort failed. CRAVER, supra note 7, at 32. Since that time labor has
achieved no significant legislative victories at the federal level. By way of contrast,
major employee protection legislation directed at the workforce as a whole has been
enacted regularly including Title VII of the Civil Rights Act in 1964 with major
amendments in 1972 and 1991, 42 U .S.C. § 2000e--e- l 7 (2000); the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act in 1967 with major amendments in 1974, 1978, 1986, and 1991, 29
U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2000); the Americans with Disabilities Act in 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§
12101-12213 (2000); the Employee Retirement Income Security Act in 1974 with major
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labor's most important weapon, is used sparingly because of the difficulty in
prevailing and the potential loss ofjobs and public support. 51 Labor has searched
for new tools for organizing employees and putting economic pressure on
employers, with limited success. 52
The labor movement has long been criticized for its failure to appeal to the
growing portion of the workforce-people of color, many recent immigrants, and

amendments in 1984, 1985, 1986, 1989 and 1996, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2000); the
Occupational Safety and Health Act in 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (2000); the Family
and Medical Leave Act in 1993, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (2000); the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act in 1996, 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-gg-2 (2000); the
Employee Polygraph Protection Act in 1988, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2001-2009 (2000); the Older
Workers Benefit and Protection Act in 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-433; and the Worker
Adjustment Retraining and Notification Act in 1988, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2102-2109 (2000).
While organized labor has been a major supporter of most employee protective
legislation, such legislation also has broader support from other advocacy groups for
workers, consumers and retirees including the AARP, the NAACP, the National
Organization for Women, various disability rights groups, and the National Partnership
for Women and Families.
51. See U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Bureau of Labor
Statistics Data, at http://www.bls.gov (last visited Mar. 29, 2004) (showing substantial
decline in both number of work stoppages and number of employees participating in
work stoppages since 1960). For example, there were more than two hundred work
stoppages involving one thousand or more employees each year from 1960 to 1979, and
in some years more than four hundred. See id. In 1980 and 1981 there were more than
one hundred stoppages and since that time the number has never been greater than one
hundred. See id. In most years there have been fewer than fifty and in some years as few
as seventeen or nineteen. See id. Unable to use the strike effectively, many unions have
gone long periods without a collective bargaining agreement in effect.
52. See Cent. Ill. Pub. Serv. Co., 326 N.L.R.B. 928, 928-29, 947-48 (1998)
(describing "inside game" tactics used by union including refusals to work voluntary
overtime, working to the rule, and filing of grievances as a group); STEPHEN FRANKLIN,
THREE STRIKES: LABOR'S HEARTLAND LoSSES AND WHAT THEY MEAN FOR WORKING
AMERICANS 27-3 7 (200 I)( describing the use of corporate campaigns by labor unions);
PAUL OSTERMAN ET AL., WORKING IN AMERICA: A BLUEPRINT FOR THE NEW LABOR
MARKET I 05-19 (describing new organizing efforts in the telecommunications industry,
for professional and managerial employees and for low income and contingent workers);
Crain & Matheny, supra note 2, at 1785 (describing the AFL-CIO's new emphasis on
organizing); Christopher L. Erickson et al., Justice for Janitors in Los Angeles: Lessons
from Three Rounds ofNegotiations, 40 BRIT. J. INDUS. REL. 543 (2002) (describing the
Justice for Janitors campaign which successfully organized janitorial workers in Los
Angeles office buildings using public protests, coalition building, and strategic pressure,
and has maintained the union through three negotiating cycles); Nathan Newman, Union
and Community Mobilization in the Information Age, PERSPECTIVES ON WORK, Aug.
2002, at 9, 9-10 (describing the use of the Internet as an organizing tool for widely
dispersed workers and for publicizing negative information about employers to pressure
them to recognize unions).
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white women-many of whom are in service rather than manufacturingjobs.s 3
Some unions have a history of overt discrimination, while others historically
have made efforts to eliminate discrimination and increase inclusiveness. s4 The
failure to include these groups as an integral part of the labor movement has been
cited as a cause for the decline of unions.ss While unions have made some
efforts to bridge this gap in recent years,s 6 the hierarchy of most unions remains

53. Marion Crain, Between Feminism and Unionism: Working Class Women, Sex
Equality & Labor Speech, 82 GEO. L.J. 1903, 1942-46 ( 1994) [hereinafter Crain, Between
Feminism]; Marion Crain, Critical Race Studies: Colorblind Unionism, 49 UCLA L.
REV. 1313, 1322-23 (2002) [hereinafter Crain, Colorblind]; Marion Crain & Ken
Matheny, "Labor's Divided Ranks": Privilege and the United Front Ideology, 84
CoRNELLL.REv.1542, 1594-96 (1999); Charles B. Craver, The Vitality ofthe American
Labor Movement in the Twenty-First Century, 1983 U. ILL. L. REv. 633, 648-49;
Theodore J. St. Antoine, Federal Regulation ofthe Workplace in the Next Half Century,
61 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 631, 645 (1985).
54. See Michael J. Goldberg, Affirmative Action in Union Government: The
Landrum-Griffin Act Implications, 44 OHIO ST. L.J. 649, 652-53 ( 1983) (discussing the
history of discrimination in the labor movement); Steven H. Kropp, Deconstructing

Racism in American Society-The Role Labor Law Might Have Played (But Did Not) in
Ending Race Discrimination: A Partial Explanation and Historical Commentary, 23
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 369, 380-85, 398 (2002)(detailing history of discrimination
by railroad unions against African-Americans but also noting important labor support for
the 1964 Civil Rights Act); Lowell Turner & Richard W. Hurd, Building Social

Movement Unionism:

The Transformation of the American Labor Movement, in

REKINDLING THE MOVEMENT: LABOR'S QUEST FOR RELEVANCE IN THE TwENTY-FIRST
CENTURY 15 (Lowell Turner et al. eds., 2001) (noting that although labor supported civil
rights legislation and some unions were active in the civil rights movement, Hispanic and
black workers were excluded from many high paying union jobs, often with the support
ofunions). See generally WILLIAM B. GOULD, BLACK WORKERS IN WHITE UNIONS: JOB
DISCRIMINATION IN THE UNITED STATES (1977) (discussing the history of unions and
race).
55. Craver, supra note 53, at 648-49; Ruth Needleman, Comments, in WOMEN AND
UNIONS: FORGING A PARTNERSHIP 406, 410-11 (Dorothy Sue Cobble ed., 1993)
(highlighting ways in which "union culture discourages female participation and
leadership"); St. Antoine, supra note 53, at 645; Stone, supra note 7, at 581.
56. See Crain & Matheny, supra note 2, at 1784-85, 1829-30 (describing the AFLCIO' s recent initiatives to appeal to women, people of color and immigrant workers and
to focus on social justice); Ruth Milkman & Kent Wong, Organizing Immigrant
Workers: Case Studies from Southern California, in REKINDLING THE MOVEMENT,supra
note 54, at 99-128 (describing and analyzing successful and unsuccessful efforts to
organize immigrant workers); Stone, supra note 7, at 581-82 (arguing that unions have
appealed to women and people of color).
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predominantly white and male. 57 For most unions, the attempt to become more
inclusive has been sporadic and tentative.

D. Proposals for Change
Proposals to address the above-identified problems abound. 58 Among the
early proposals were changes in the National Labor Relations Act to make
remedies for anti-union conduct more effective and union representation easier
to obtain. 59 Comparisons with Canadian law, which is more protective of

57. GOULD, supra note 54, at 16 (noting the relative absence of African-Americans
from policymaking positions in unions); Crain, Between Feminism, supra note 53, at
1944 (noting the underrepresentation of women in leadership and organizing positions,
even in unions where women predominate); Goldberg, supra note 54, at 653-55 (citing
under-representation of women and people of color in union leadership positions); Lois
S. Gray, The Route to the Top: Female Union Leaders and Union Policy, in WOMEN
AND UNIONS, supra note 55, at 378-93 (Dorothy Sue Cobble ed., 1993) (noting the
relative lack of women in the top leadership of unions and analyzing reasons therefore).
58. Of course, not every observer or scholar views all of the changes as
problematic. Some perceive the reduction of unionization as beneficial to the economy
and others see the increase in individual rights as advantageous to workers. See, e.g.,
BARRY T. HIRSCH & JOHN T. ADDISON, THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF UNIONS: NEW
APPROACHES AND EVIDENCE 211-15 (1986) (concluding that unionization decreases
profitability, which is likely to impact negatively on investment behavior and long-run
economic performance); MORGAN 0. REYNOLDS, MAKING AMERICA POORER: THE COST
OF LABOR LAW 192-94 (l 987)(arguing that privileged treatment ofunions, especially the
rule of exclusive representation, hurts workers by taking away their freedom to "search
out the highest bidder for their labor services"); Charles Fried, Individual and Collective

Rights in Work Relations: Reflections on the Current State of Labor Law and its
Prospects, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 1012, 1027-29 (l984)(questioning whether the high price
individuals must pay in order to unionize, in terms of money and loss of freedom, is
worth any benefits that might arise from unionization); John A. Litwinski, Regulation of
Labor Market Monopsony, 22 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 49, 86-92 (200 l )(arguing that
unions create economic inefficiencies and harm consumers). Others see the move toward
ADR in lieu of litigation as a positive trend. Raymond J. Broderick, Court-Annexed
Compulsory Arbitration: It Works, 72 JUDICATURE 217 (l 989) (arguing that success of
court-annexed ADR programs suggests enlarging and expanding the practice); Warren
E. Burger, Isn't There a Better Way?, 68 A.B.A. J. 274 (1982) (arguing that arbitration
should be utilized to complement courts); Carol J. King, Are Justice and Harmony
Mutually Exclusive? A Response to Professor Nadar, l 0 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. REsOL. 65
(l 994) (responding to critique of mediation); Judge Dorothy Wright Nelson, ADR in the

Federal Courts-One Judge's Perspective: Issues and Challenges Facing Judges,
Lawyers, Court Administrators, and the Public, 17 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. l (200 l ).
59. See, e.g., CRAVER, supra note 7, at 152-53 (proposing that the National Labor
Relations Act be amended to provide for immediate reinstatement of illegally terminated
union supporters, to allow the NLRB to order an employer to bargain with the union
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employee and union rights in a similar economy with a much higher unionization
rate, supported many of the proposals for change. 60 There followed other
recommendations for changes in the law. Some commentators urged elimination
or restriction of Section 8(a)(2) of the NLRA, which outlaws company unions,
to allow additional opportunities for employee voice through organizations
created or influenced by the employer. 61 This recommendation frequently was
accompanied by suggestions that the German system of W arks Councils be
adopted in the United States, providing another vehicle for employee voice in
employer decision-making. 62 Others contended that a narrower exclusion for

which was unlawfully prevented from gaining majority support by egregious employer
unfair labor practices, and to provide "make-whole relief' to employees where the
employer unjustifiably refused to bargain with the union); GOULD, supra note l, at 15180 (suggesting, among other amendments, adoption of measures to shorten the delay in
resolution of unfair labor practice proceedings, double or triple back pay awards to
employees unfairly discharged, and "first-contract" arbitration as a solution to the erosion
of support during the union-employer bargaining process); PAUL C. WEILER, GOVERNING
THE WORKPLACE: THE FuTURE OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW 243-52 (1990)
(recommending accelerating the process of reinstating workers illegally discharged
during a union representation contest by providing interimjudiciaryreliefpending a final
verdict); see also Report and Recommendations of the Commission on the Future of
Worker-Management Relations, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) Special Supp. No. 6 (Jan. 10,
1995) [hereinafter Dunlop Commission Report]. President Clinton appointed the
Commission to consider and make recommendations designed to "build more cooperative
and productive workplace relations." Id. at 10. The Commission recommended, inter
alia, expedited union representation elections, injunctive actions to remedy discriminatory
discharges occurring during organizing campaigns and negotiations for first contracts,
and dispute resolution systems to assist unions and employers in achieving first contracts.
Id. at 12-13.
60. Weiler, supra note 8, at 1805-06 (explaining that Canadian unions have the
right to bargain for employees once a majority of employees have signed authorization
cards).
61. See Dunlop Commission Report, supra note 59, at 25 (urging both revision to,
and interpretation of, Section 8(a)(2) to render lawful nonunion employee participation
programs if discussion of terms and conditions of work is incidental to the purpose of the
program); Craver, supra note 8, at 430-31 (recommending interpretation of Section
8(a)(2) to permit employee participation programs not designed to deprive employees of
union representation rights); Michael H. Gottesman, In Despair, Starting Over:
Imagining a Labor Law for Unorganized Workers, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 59, 86-87
( 1993) (urging that Section 8(a)(2) be interpreted to restrain employee participation in the
nonunion workplace only where an organizing campaign is ongoing or has occurred
within the prior two years). But see Michael C. Harper, A Framework for the
Rejuvenation of the American Labor Movement, 76 IND. L.J. 103, 110-15 (2001)
(expressing skepticism about the adverse impact of Section 8(a)(2) on opportunities for
employee voice).
62. See WEILER, supra note 59, at 283-95.
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supervisors and managers would provide more employees with the opportunity
to unionize. 63 Still others advocated that nonmajority unions seek to bargain for
their members, with or without a change in the law to eliminate the requirement
of majority representation. 64 Professor Finkin has suggested that state law might
be used to fill the representation gap. 65 Professor Harper has offered a creative
proposal for two-tier representation, a modification of the German Works
Council system with the two levels of union representation differing in both
scope of the bargaining unit and negotiating authority. 66 Professor Stone has
suggested a number of changes in the NLRA that would make the statute more
relevant to the changing workplace, including allowing bargaining units to be
determined by employee desires rather than rigid employer boundaries, allowing
peaceful secondary boycotts and closed shops, broadening the definition of
"employee," and requiring multi-employer bargaining when sought by the
union. 67 Many of these proposals are thoughtful and worthwhile suggestions that
might accomplish some, ifnot all, of their intended objectives. Yet the prospect
for legal change more supportive of unionization is dim. 68
Professors Gottesman and Estreicher have suggested that unions might
become service providers to employees without majority representation, offering

63. See GOULD, supra note 1, at 141-42; Dunlop Commission Report, supra note
59, at 27-28.
64. See Crain & Matheny, supra note 53, at 1616-24; Matthew W. Finkin, The
Road Not Taken: Some Thoughts on Nonmajority Employee Representation, 69 CHI.KENT L. REV. 195 ( 1993 ); Alan Hyde et al., After Smyrna: Rights and Powers ofUnions
that Represent Less than a Majority, 45 RUTGERS L. REV. 637 (1993); George Schatzki,
Majority Rule, Exclusive Representation, and the Interests of Individual Workers:
Should Exclusivity be Abolished?, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 897 ( 1975); Clyde Summer, Unions
Without Majority-A Black Hole?, 66 CHI.-l<ENT L. REV. 531 (1990).
65. Matthew W. Finkin, Bridging the "Representation Gap'', 3 U. PA. J. LAB. &
EMP. L. 391, 408-19 (2001) (suggesting that states could legislate representational and
employee participation requirements short of exclusive bargaining).
66. Harper, supra note 61, at 124-27. Under this proposal, first tier representatives
would be chosen by a majority of employees at a single employer by either a card check
or a representation election in which the employer could not participate. Id. at 124-25.
First tier representatives could negotiate agreements with just cause protection for
discipline and grievance and arbitration procedures, and could help enforce external laws,
but could not negotiate economic terms or use economic pressure such as strikes. Id.
Second tier representatives, which would have the authority to negotiate economic terms
and strike after an employee authorization vote, would be selected in broader bargaining
units, including those with existing first tier representatives. Id. at 126.
67. Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Employee Representation in the Boundaryless
Workplace, 77 CHI.-KENTL.REv. 773, 816-18 (2002).
68. For an interesting discussion of the source of many current problems with the
NLRA and the prospects for legal change, see Cynthia L. Estlund, The Ossification of
American Labor Law, 102 COLUM. L. REv.1527 (2002).
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to employee/members bargaining expertise on complex issues such as pensions
and insurance, and enabling them to negotiate for collective goods. 69 Under this
proposal, unions would represent employees (or provide lawyers for employees)
in contractual negotiations or in cases ranging from discrimination claims to
wrongful discharge lawsuits to claims for family or medical leave. 70 One focus
of these proposals has been representation of employees in dispute resolution
systems imposed by nonunion employers. 71 This provision of services may
increase the power of unions and perhaps allow them to grow into majority
representation. 72
Because of the changes in the workplace from a career-employment model
based on internal labor markets to one where employees move more frequently
among employers and are urged to structure their own careers, scholars have
recommended changes in union structure to represent employees more
effectively in such labor markets. 73 Union organization on a multi-employer

69. Gottesman, supra note 61, at 81-82; Samuel Estreicher, Freedom of Contract
and labor law Reform: Opening up the Possibilities for Value-Added Unionism, 71
N.Y.U. L. REV. 827, 833-34 (1996).
70. Robert Rabin recognized early the possibility of an expanded role for unions
in enforcing public rights of employees who were not part of traditional bargaining units.
See Robert J. Rabin, The Role of Unions in the Rights-Based Workplace, 25 U.S.F. L.
REV. 169 (1991).
71. Although scholars initially suggested that there was no legal impediment to
providing such service where the union is not the majority representative of employees,
several recent decisions from federal appellate courts have found provision of legal
services to be an unlawful preelection benefit which warrants setting aside representation
elections won by unions. See Freund Baking Co. v. NLRB, 165 F.3d 928 (D.C. Cir.
1999); Nestle Ice Cream Co. v. NLRB, 46 F.3d 578 (6th Cir. 1995). Although the NLRB
has not agreed, the decision by the D.C. Circuit, an appeal venue for any Board case,
makes the Board's retention of its position permitting such assistance futile. Catherine
L. Fisk, Union lawyers and Employment law, 23 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 57, 60-61
(2002). Fisk argues persuasively in favor of the Board's position. Id.
72. Gottesman, supra note 61, at 81-83.
73. See, e.g., HECKSCHER,supra note 8, at 155-231 (recommending a new form of
unionism, more flexible and decentralized, which he denominates "associational
unionism"); OSTERMAN ET AL., supra note 52, at 95-129 (discussing various strategies
for unions facing substantial changes in the workplace); Daniel Cornfield, Labor Union
Responses to Technological Change: Past Present and Future, PERSPECTIVES ON WORK,
Apr. 1997, at 35, 38 (advocating that unions respond to corporate changes by becoming
suppliers of labor and establishing union-controlled consulting systems for employees
facing technological change, which would provide employees with both a knowledge
base for changing jobs and a job referral network); Charles Heckscher, living with
Flexibility, in REKINDLING THE MOVEMENT, supra note 54, at 59, 68-69, 75-78; Stone,
supra note 67, at 802-03 (discussing union strategies for the boundaryless workplace
including "new craft unionism," in which unions bargain for minimum standards and
training and allow individual bargaining above the minimum).
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occupation or craft basis, like that which exists in the construction industry,
would permit unions to serve workers by providing training, portable benefits,
and perhaps even referrals for jobs with unionized employers. 74 Like other
recommendations for change, union restructuring would be facilitated by
changes in the law that would permit, inter alia, multi-employer bargaining
where requested by the union, bargaining units determined by the desires of the
employees, inclusion of independent contractors under the NLRA, and secondary
boycotts within a network of related employers. 75
Other scholars have taken a slightly different route, focusing on the need for
unions to appeal to the increasing portion of the workforce composed of persons
of color and white women. Professor Marion Crain, frequently writing with Ken
Matheny, has been a leading advocate for this approach. In a series of articles,
she has suggested that unions have focused on class consciousness to the
exclusion of other relevant aspects of worker identity such as gender, race and
ethnicity. 76 A transformation of the labor movement is required to enable it to
effectively represent all workers and combat the employers' strategy of "divide
and conquer."77 Crain and Matheny suggest legal reforms to enforce this basic
shift in labor movement ideology. Like other scholars, Crain and Matheny
advocate elimination of the majority rule and exclusive representation
requirement, suggesting that it will permit advocacy by nonlabor groups and
allow organization around multiple identities, such as race and gender. 78 Further,

74. See OSTERMAN ET AL., supra note 52, at 118 (discussing the South Bay Labor
Council's program in Silicon Valley creating a temporary employment agency to raise
wages and improve employment stability for temporary workers); Dorothy Sue Cobble,
Lost Ways of Unionism: Historical Perspectives on Reinventing the Labor Movement,
in REKINDLING THE MOVEMENT, supra note 54, at 82, 84-87 (describing occupational
unionism of the past and current efforts to revive that form of unionism); Cornfield,
supra note 73, at 38; Heckscher, supra note 73, at 68-69, 75-78 (describing the foci of
unions in the increasingly mobile workforce and examples of organizations working
toward such a model); Stone, supra note 67, at 802-10 (describing "new craft unionism").
75. Stone, supra note 67, at 816-18.
76. Crain, Between Feminism, supra note 53, at 1906-08; Crain, Colorblind, supra
note 53, at 1313; Crain & Matheny, supra note 53, at 1543-45; see also Michael Selmi
& Molly S. McUsic, Difference and Solidarity: Unions in a Postmodern Age, in LABOUR
LAW IN AN ERA OF GLOBALIZATION: TRANSFORMATIVE PRACTICES AND POSSIBILITIES
429, 431-33 (Joanne Conaghan et al. eds., 2002) (criticizing unions for failure to focus
on race, gender and ethnicity).
77. Crain & Matheny, supra note 53, at 1609-13.
78. Id. at 1617-19. Crain and Matheny suggest that the change would make
economic tactics such as boycotts and picketing both more effective and perhaps lawful
in contexts currently prohibited, such as secondary boycotts. Id. at 1623. More recently,
Crain has advocated making race and ethnicity factors in determining appropriate
bargaining units because ignoring racial and ethnic identity perpetuates racial
disadvantage. Crain, Colorblind, supra note 53. For another critique of the legal
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they urge imposition of a requirement that unions work affirmatively to eliminate
discrimination rather than merely decline to participate in it. 79 In conjunction
with this recommendation, they suggest that arbitration of statutory
discrimination claims should be a mandatory subject of bargaining and that
arbitration of such claims through a union negotiated procedure should preclude
later litigation. 8° Crain and Matheny argue that there is far less risk of
disadvantage to workers in arbitration of statutory claims where the procedure
and representation are negotiated by the union. 81
Critics have suggested identity-based organizing as a tool to broaden the
appeal of unions. 82 The proposals vary from recommendations that union
organizing campaigns focus on multiple aspects of employee identity,83 to
suggested organization of caucuses as precursors to unions or within unions, 84
to arguments that racial and ethnic identity be a factor in deciding the appropriate
bargaining unit in union organizing campaigns. 85
Virtually all of the proposals recommend significant changes in the law to
enable achievement of their objectives. While some incremental change can
occur without legal alteration, and indeed most scholars offer current or historic
examples to support their recommendations,86 in the end legal change will be

system's impact on subordinated groups, see Elizabeth M. Iglesias, Structures of
Subordination: Women ofColor at the Intersection of Title VII and the NLRA. Not!, 28
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 395 (1993) (criticizing the courts and Board for interpreting
Title VII and the NLRA in ways that continue the subordination of women of color).
79. Crain & Matheny, supra note 2, at 1839-41.
80. Id. at 1841-46.
81. Id. at 1842-45.
82. See, e.g., Crain, Colorblind, supra note 53, at 1331-34; Alan Hyde, Employee
Caucus: A Key Institution in the Emerging System of Employment Law, 69 CHl.-KENT
L. REV. 149, 158-62 ( 1993) (suggesting use of caucuses inside the union); Iglesias, supra
note 78, at 478-88 (advocating self-representation for women of color); Maria L.
Ontiveros, A New Course for Labor Unions: Identity-Based Organizing as a Response
to Globalization, in LABOUR LAW, supra note 76, at 417, 417,422-24; see also Selmi &
McUsic, supra note 76, at 434-35 (describing various proposals for identity organizing).
83. Ontiveros, supra note 82, at 417-21.
84. Marion Crain, Women, Labor Unions, and Hostile Work Environment Sexual
Harassment: The Untold Story, 4 TEx. J. WOMEN & L. 9, 61, 66-76 (1995)
(recommending use of identity caucuses to represent women within the union,
particularly in the context of sexual harassment grievances); Ruben J. Garcia, New Voices
at Work: Race and Gender Identity Caucuses in the U.S. Labor Movement, 54 HASTINGS
L.J. 79 (2002) (supporting identity caucuses within unions); Hyde, supra note 82, at 16062.
85. Crain, Colorblind, supra note 53, at 1331-32.
86. OSTERMAN ET AL., supra note 52, at 105-22 (citing various examples ofunion
responses to changes in the labor market, including successful efforts at organizing
professionals and managers, low income workers and contingent workers); Cobble, supra
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essential to transformation. Change in the law may come about, however,
because of demonstrated efficacy of new models on a small scale. One
recommendation for change that necessitates no change in law is negotiation of
a mediation provision in current contracts that applies to issues not covered by
the agreement. The analysis below demonstrates that use of mediation may be
an incremental change that may help to achieve some of the important broader
goals articulated above.

II.

MEDIATION OF DISPUTES OUTSIDE THE COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING AGREEMENT

A. Contractual Grievance and Arbitration Provisions
Almost all collective bargaining agreements contain grievance and
arbitration procedures designed to resolve disputes about the interpretation and
application of the agreement. The common structure for such provisions is a
series of steps in which progressively higher level officials of the company and
union attempt to resolve the dispute, culminating in binding arbitration by a
neutral arbitrator. 87 In most contracts, the arbitrator is confined to interpreting
and applying the agreement. A few contracts incorporate disputes outside the
agreement into the grievance procedure and some also provide for arbitration of
such disputes. In addition, sometimes there is overlap between the provisions of
the contract and provisions oflaw, such that arbitration of a contract dispute may

note 74, at 84-87 (describing efforts to revive occupational unionism); Marion Crain,
Whitewashed labor law, Skin walking Unions, 23 BERKELEY J. LAB. & EMP. L. 211, 22428, 228-29 (2002) (describing coalition of traditional union and African-American
religious community to address racial discrimination and economic oppression, and union
efforts to organize immigrant workers by focusing on their unique needs); Crain &
Matheny, supra note 53, at 1617-19 (providing examples of non labor groups engaged in
worker advocacy supporting women and all people of color, in some cases collaborating
with traditional unions); Hecksher, supra note 73, at 75-78 (describing the efforts of
organizations to provide workers with security, power, and voice in the new economy);
Ontiveros, supra note 82, at 418-21 (describing union campaigns using identity-based
organizing); Stone, supra note 67, at 804-08, 814-16 (providing current examples of new
craft unionism by International Alliance of Theatrical and State Employees ("IA TSE"),
Justice for Janitors, and several hotel and construction unions, and the historic example
of waitress unions. Stone also provides examples of what she calls "citizen unions,"
community-based organizations that address the issues of workers and citizens across
various workplaces.).
87. Some contracts provide for joint arbitration boards composed of equal numbers
of management and union representatives, either with or without a subsequent appeal to
a neutral arbitrator.
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effectively resolve legal issues as well. 88 The Supreme Court has stated,
however, that an employee cannot be precluded from litigating a legal claim by
a union contractual provision providing for arbitration unless it clearly and
unmistakably waives the employee's right to a judicial forum. 89 It is not
uncommon for arbitrators to deal with legal issues in resolving contractual claims
because of the substantial potential for overlap of legal and contractual claims.
The law is often used as an aid to interpretation of the collective bargaining
agreement.

B. Grievance Mediation
In the past twenty years, there has been a resurgence of interest in grievance
mediation, which was more commonly used in the early years of contractual
grievance procedures. 9° Current usage of mediation for contractual disputes adds
a mediation step in the contractual procedure prior to arbitration. 91 The parties
to the agreement determine which grievances will be mediated. If initial
discussions do not result in an agreement, the mediator, who is also an
experienced arbitrator, offers a prediction as to how an arbitrator would decide
the dispute. The parties can then pursue additional discussions, with unresolved
grievances proceeding to arbitration with a different neutral and without use of
any information revealed in mediation. The benefits of mediating grievances
have been ably articulated by Professors Steve Goldberg and Jeanne Brett, who
began experimenting with grievance mediation in the coal industry. 92 They
found that mediation resolved disputes more quickly, with less investment of
party resources, and greater participant satisfaction. 93 The parties were able to
focus on interest-based problem solving rather than taking the win/lose positions

88. In Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co. the Supreme Court found that arbitration
of a contractual claim challenging the employee's discharge, which overlapped with a
legal claim that the discharge violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, did not preclude
the employee's lawsuit on the race discrimination claim. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver
Co., 415 U.S. 36, 59-60 (1974).
89. Wright v. Universal Mar. Servs. Corp., 525 U.S. 70, 79-80 (1998).
90. See Helen El kiss, Alternatives to Arbitration: Are Unions Ready for Change?,
48 LAB. L.J. 675, 677-80 (1997); Feuille, supra note 5, at 187; Stephen B. Goldberg, The
Mediation of Grievances Under a Collective Bargaining Contract: An Alternative to
Arbitration, 77 NW. U. L. REV. 270 (1982).
91. This description of current grievance mediation is based on the model used by
Stephen Goldberg and Jeanne Brett in the mediation experiment in the coal industry.
Stephen B. Goldberg & Jeanne M. Brett, An Experiment in the Mediation ofGrievances,
106 MONTHLy LAB. REV., Mar. 1983, at 23.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 26-27.
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typical of arbitration. 94 In addition, mediation helped preserve the ongoing
relationship of the parties and assisted them in developing their own problem
solving skills. 95 Mediation has been successful at resolving contractual
grievances at low cost and high satisfaction in those relationships in which it has
been adopted. 96 Although favorable reports about grievance mediation are
legion, it has remained limited to a small part of the unionized workforce. 97
C. Mediation of Claims Not Covered by the

Collective Bargaining Agreement
Despite the spread of grievance mediation and mediation of disputes in the
nonunion workplace, 98 there has been little discussion of mediation of
noncontractual claims in the unionized workplace. The one significant exception
is the Postal Service's REDRESS system.99 There has been some effort to
require exclusive arbitration of statutory claims in the unionized workplace,
however. ' 00 While I have argued elsewhere that it is risky for unions to waive
employees' statutory rights to litigate, 101 mediation offers an opportunity for
unions to provide a nonbinding forum for resolution of workplace disputes that
are not covered by the collective bargaining agreement. Such disputes would
include statutory and common law legal claims, such as discrimination or
wrongful termination, and nonlegal disputes such as communication problems
or interpersonal conflicts. There are benefits to mediation for employees, unions
and employers alike which make it a feasible option for collective bargaining.

94. See Stephen B. Goldberg & Jeanne M. Brett, Disputants' Perspectives on the
Differences Between Mediation and Arbitration, 6 NEGOTIATION J. 249, 253-54 (1990).
95. See Stephen B. Goldberg, Grievance Mediation: A Successful Alternative to
labor Arbitration, 5 NEGOTIATION J. 9, 12-13 (1989).
96. Elkiss, supra note 90, at 677-80; Feuille, supra note 5, at 187, 191-95.
97. Feuille, supra note 5, at 197.
98. See infra notes 259-68 and accompanying text.
99. Lisa B. Bingham et al., Exploring the Role of Representation in Employment
Mediation at the USPS, 17 OHIO Sr. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 341, 356 (2002).
100. See Safrit v. Cone Mills Corp., 248 F.3d 306, 308 (4th Cir. 2001) (holding
that language of collective bargaining agreement clearly and unmistakably waived
employee's right to litigate her discrimination claim, leaving arbitration as her only
forum); Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'! v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 199 F.3d 477, 485-86
(D.C. Cir. 1999), enf'd, 211 F.3d 1312 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (holding that individual
agreements to arbitrate statutory discrimination claims are not mandatory subjects of
bargaining and therefore employer could unilaterally impose them on union employees
without bargaining with the union).
101. See Ann C. Hodges, Protecting Unionized Employees Against Discrimination:
The Fourth Circuit's Misinterpretation ofSupreme Court Precedent, 2 EMPLOYEE Rrs.
& EMP. POL'Y J. 123 (1998).
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Accordingly, unions and employers should seriously consider an agreement to
offer mediation of all workplace disputes.
Mediation of noncontractual claims should be voluntary, at least on the part
of the employee. 102 Dispute resolution academics have debated the merits of
voluntary versus mandatory mediation. 103 Voluntary mediation minimizes duty
of fair representation concerns for the union, which may be a particular concern
when employees mediate legal claims. 104 Because of the risk of fair
representation claims, voluntary mediation will be preferable from the union's
point of view. While the risk is not as great for nonlegal claims, employers may
be reluctant to agree to a mediation procedure which does not cover legal
claims. 105 Employees may also resist a system that requires mediation of legal
claims. Thus, voluntary mediation is most likely to be adopted. 106 In order for
a voluntary system to be effective, however, the union and employer must
educate employees about mediation and advocate effectively for the program. 107
The forum should give employees the choice of representation by the union
or any other representative selected by the employee. While many employees
might choose union representation, others may prefer attorneys or other

102. If the employer has an existing mediation program for nonunion employees,
the parties could consider opening it up to union employees on a voluntary basis. Before
agreeing to such a program, however, the union should evaluate the program to ensure
that it indeed provides a benefit to the employees and permits representation by the union
or other chosen representatives. Alternatively, the union-negotiated system could be
opened up to nonunion employees to increase utilization and make it more cost effective
for the employer. An added benefit for the union would be the prospect of convincing
nonunion employees of the benefits of unionization.
103. See SARAH R. COLE ET AL., MEDIATION: LAW, POLICY & PRACTICE§ 7.3, at
7-11 (2d ed. 2001).
104. See infra Part 11.G (discussing duty of fair representation issues).
I 05. See infra notes 155-56 and accompanying text.
106. But see Goldberg & Brett, supra note 91, at 29 (noting the high settlement
rates when grievance mediation is required at the option of one party or for all
grievances, and recommending further research on mandatory mediation).
107. The REDRESS system has had significant utilization despite its voluntary
nature. Cynthia J. Hallberlin, Transforming Workplace Culture Through Mediation:
Lessons Learned from Swimming Upstream, 18 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 375, 379
(2001) (stating that twenty thousand cases were mediated in the first two years after full
implementation of the program). Of course, most employers do not have the substantial
number of potential parties and disputes present at the Postal Service. A pilot mediation
program for state employees in Ohio found that a relatively small number of cases were
actually mediated. L. Camille Hebert, Establishing and Evaluating a Workplace
Mediation Pilot Project: An Ohio Case Study, 14 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 415, 424
(1999). Evaluators suggested that insufficient promotion of the program, supervisor and
employee hostility, and administrative difficulties may have contributed to the limited use
of the program. Id. at 439-42.

2004]

UNIONS AND MEDIATION

387

advocates. In addition, the process should use outside mediators if at all
possible. Outside mediators are preferable to internal mediators because they are
perceived as fairer, and the perception of fairness or procedural justice is
important to the success of any mediation program. 108
A more complex question is the type of mediation that should be chosen.
Before discussing that issue, however, a review of both the potential benefits of
such a mediation program and the empirical evidence about existing mediation
programs is appropriate.

1. Benefits for the Union
Negotiation of a mediation forum allows unions to provide an additional
benefit to represented employees, thereby strengthening the employee support
for the union, which will assist the union in continuing as the employees'
representative. The employees will not only obtain a forum for vindicating
statutory rights without waiver of their right to litigate, but they will also acquire
a vehicle for resolving other disputes that may make their work life difficult, but
are not covered by the collective bargaining agreement. In addition, the trained
and experienced union representatives who serve as advocates in the mediation
process can represent employees in other forums. 109 The Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") currently uses mediation in many
discrimination disputes. 110 The Department of Labor also has begun to use

108. Lisa B. Bingham & David W. Pitts, Highlights ofMediation at Work: Studies
of the National REDRESS Evaluation Project, 18 NEGOTIATION J. 135, 138-39 (2002)
(reporting that participant satisfaction rates for process, outcome and mediator were
higher when outside mediators were used as compared to inside mediators, but noting
that levels of satisfaction were high with both models); Traci Gabhart Gann & Cynthia
J. Hallberlin, Recruiting and Training Outside Neutrals, in FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE
DISPUTE REsOLUTION DESKBOOK 623, 623 (Marshall J. Breger et al. eds., 2001 ); Jennie
Kihnley, Unraveling the Ivory Fabric: Institutional Obstacles to the Handling ofSexual
Harassment Complaints, 25 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 69, 73 (2000) (discussing importance
of perception of mediator neutrality and concerns that internal mediators may be
pressured to reach solutions favorable to the employer); see also Ann C. Hodges,
Mediation and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 30 GA. L. REV. 431, 485-93 (1996)
(discussing the relative merits of using internal versus outside mediators in mediation
programs conducted by administrative enforcement agencies).
109. Mediation training may assist advocates in representing employees in
investigatory interviews as permitted by NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 260
(1975).
110. See E. PATRICK MCDERMOTT ET AL., AN EVALUATION OF THE EQUAL
EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION MEDIATION PROGRAM (2000), at http://www.
eeoc.gov/mediate/report/chapter2.html (last modified Oct. 2, 2000); Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission's Alternative Dispute Resolution Policy Statement, at
http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/adrstatement.html (last modified Mar. 25, 2002);
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mediation in disputes involving ERISA, the FMLA, and various whistleblower
laws. 111 Union representatives could serve as employee advocates in these
governmental mediation programs.
Trained union representatives also could provide services to unrepresented
employees in employer-adopted dispute resolution systems. 112 Advocacy for
nonunion employees could enhance the union's prospects for organizing
additional workplaces and even growing members where the union does not
represent a majority. 113 In addition, the problem solving experience gained
through participation in mediation will aid union and employer representatives
in resolving disputes in the grievance and arbitration procedure and perhaps even
in collective bargaining negotiations, thus improving the collective bargaining
relationship to the benefit of the union, the employer, and the employees. 114
Because the mediation option will cover both statutory discrimination
claims and other statutory claims of strong interest to groups that have
historically been perceived as outsiders to the union culture, 11 s mediation offers
unions a vehicle for greater inclusion. The mediation procedure provides a
forum for resolution of such disputes, and union representation and support to
achieve resolution. In addition, it provides the union with an opportunity to
include more employee/members in union activities. Mediation offers an

Dominguez Reports Drop in Charge Inventory, Expanded Mediation Emphasis in Fiscal
2002, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 204, at A-6 (Oct. 22, 2002) (reporting on EEOC's
expansion of its mediation program in 2002 to become largest workplace mediation
program in the U.S.); Another New Mediation Project at EEOC Expands Efforts to Nine
State, Local Agencies, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 79, at A-5 {Apr. 24, 2003) (reporting
on EEOC's expansion of mediation program to allow charges filed with the EEOC in
nine states to be mediated by state and local agencies with which the EEOC maintains
worksharing agreements).
111. See DOL Seeks to Expand Use of Mediators to Resolve Disputes Under
Employment Laws, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 01, at AA-I (Jan. 2, 2001).
112. Internal employer dispute resolution programs may take on increased
importance as the EEOC is beginning a pilot program in which it will defer
discrimination charges to certain existing employer programs upon agreement of the
charging party. Dominguez to Intensify Mediation Efforts During Second Full Year at
EEOC Helm, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 18, at S-43 (Jan. 28, 2003).
113. DUNLOP & ZACK, supra note 48, at 163; see also supra notes 69-72 and
accompanying text. Since the Weingarten right to representation at investigatory
interviews has been extended to the nonunion workplace, Epilepsy Foundation of
Northeast Ohio, 331 N.L.R.B. 676 (2000), enf'd in relevant part, 268 F.3d 1095 (D.C.
Cir. 2001 ), union advocates might provide representation for nonunion employees in such
situations. Again, such representation may enhance the union's prospects for selection
as majority representative.
114. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
115. One example of such a statute is the FMLA, providing unpaid leave for
childbirth, adoption and serious family illness. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (2000).
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effective method for resolving Title VII disputes. 116 Professor Yelnosky
advocates the use of employee identity caucuses to balance power in Title VII
mediations. 117 Such caucuses, informal networks of employees generally formed
on the basis of race, ethnicity or gender, 118 are controversial. While some, like
Yelnosky, have urged their value in addressing workplace problems unique to,
or at least more salient to, group members, 119 others have argued that caucuses
divide the employees in ways that decrease their power as a unit and enable the
employer to divide and conquer. 120 Those who support identity caucuses suggest
that the caucuses can establish collaborative relationships to consolidate power
without losing the ability to foster the goals of the identity group. 121
While some might suggest that identity groups must form outside the union
structure to be effective, union facilitation of identity groups can further union
efforts to include women and men of color. 122 Interested members of such
identity groups or caucuses could be trained to represent employees in mediation.
Such a role could be extremely important in discrimination disputes, including
harassment issues, which at times involve one union member accused of
harassing another. 123 In addition to caucuses, the union could facilitate
relationships with outside social justice organizations that would be willing to

116. Michael J. Yelnosky, Title VII, Mediation, and Collective Action, 19990.ILL.
L. REV. 583, 597-604 (noting that mediation is often quicker, cheaper, and easier to
access, and allows the parties to seek interest-based solutions, which may alter workplace
practices).
117. Id. at 613-21. Yelnosky argues that unions cannot perform this function
because of their history of discrimination, their lack of diverse leadership, and their
maj oritarian character, not to mention the decreasing rate of unionization. Id. at 611-12.
118. Id. at 613-14. They may be called identity groups, networks, or affinity
groups, but their defining characteristic is organization on the basis of social identity with
a goal of addressing workplace issues relevant to their identity. Id. For some examples
of the work of identity groups within employer organizations, see OSTERMAN ET AL.,
supra note 52, at 120-22.
119. Crain & Matheny, supra note 53, at 1617-19.
120. Molly S. McUsic & Michael Selmi, Postmodern Unions: Identity Politics in
the Workplace, 82 IOWAL. REV. 1339, 1354-58 (1997); see also Crain & Matheny, supra
note 2, at 1783 (citing criticism of identity politics by scholars and activists). Employers
also have mixed views of identity groups, with some finding them threatening and others
viewing the groups as encouraging employee participation. OSTERMAN ET AL., supra note
52, at 121.
121. Crain & Matheny, supra note 53, at 1617-19.
122. See Garcia, supra note 84, at 83; Hyde, supra note 82, at 161-62.
123. Cf Mary K. O'Melveny, Negotiating the Minefields: Selected Issues for
Labor Unions Addressing Sexual Harassment Complaints by Represented Employees,
15 LAB. LA w. 321, 352 (2000) (recommending use of separate union stewards for each
employee in cases involving harassment accusations by one union member against
another).
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provide such representation when requested. Again, such connections could
assist the union as well as the employees by creating partnerships that would
benefit the union and the social justice organizations in other arenas. 124 Such
organizations might support union organizing efforts and aid the union in
economic and legal disputes with employers where representation rights are
already established. 125 They might provide assistance to workers who lose jobs
or income because of strikes, or to low wage workers who often have family,
educational and financial needs in addition to work issues. 126 At the same time,
the union can support social justice organizations in their efforts to bring about
change in the community or to assist poor and working people. For example, the
partnership of AFSCME and BUILD, an organization of church congregations
in the black community in Baltimore, succeeded in convincing the city to enact
a living wage ordinance. 127 The two groups also created a membership
organization for workers, and city contractors agreed to deduct the membership
dues from workers' pay.1 28

124. See OSTERMAN ET AL., supra note 52, at 131-47 (discussing various newly
emerging institutions that play roles that overlap with unions, including workplace
advocacy organizations, immigrants' rights groups and living wage coalitions, some of
which partner with unions); Michelle Amber, New, Tax-Exempt Rights-At-Work Group
Being Created by Several Unions, AFL-CIO, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 39, at C-1 (Feb.
27, 2003) (describing new organization established by unions to support workers' rights
to organize, which includes as one strategy working with Jobs with Justice, the National
Interfaith Committee for Worker Justice and other workers' rights and civil rights
groups); Janice Fine, Community Unionism: The Key to the New Labor Movement,
PERSPECTIVES ON WORK, Aug. 1997, at 32 (describing collaboration between an
organization of African-American church congregations and AFSCME in Baltimore to
organize low income service workers); Dorian T. Warren & Cathy J. Cohen, Organizing
at the Intersection oflabor and Civil Rights: A Case Study of New Haven, 2 U. PA. J.
LAB. & EMP. L. 629 (2000) (urging labor unions to forge alliances with social justice
organizations and offering the New Haven Community and Labor Coalition as an
example of successful collaboration).
125. See Erickson et al., supra note 52, at 563-65 (discussing the importance of
coalition-building with politicians, churches and other unions in the Justice for Janitors
organizing campaigns, subsequent contract negotiations, and resulting strike).
126. Ruth Needleman, Building Relationships for the Long Haul: Unions and
Community-Based Groups Working Together to Organize Low-Wage Workers, in
ORGANIZING TO WIN: NEW RESEARCH ON UNION STRATEGIES 71, 72, 73 (Kate
Bronfenbrenner et al. eds., 1998).
127. See Fine, supra note 124, at 33, 35.
128. See id. at 33, 35. Fine argues that this partnership is an example of
community unionism, which "takes account of broad worker identities and interests ...
. some that are connected to occupation or employer, some that are not-but most of
which are relevant to organizing." Id. at 34; see also Needleman, supra note 126, at 7482. Needleman describes two such cooperative efforts. In California, Asian Immigrant
Women Advocates and several labor organizations engaged in a campaign to pressure a
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Finally, mediation can provide a forum for resolution of disputes within the
union. There is no legal impediment to the union negotiating a voluntary forum
for resolving disputes between employees or between employees and the
union. 129 Interpersonal conflicts or communication problems between union
members may affect the employees' ability to work together, both in their paid
employment and in their unpaid status as union members, and may potentially
subject them to employer discipline if the dispute affects their work. Legal
issues like harassment may also involve employees as both harasser and
harassee. 130 Resolution of such disputes will benefit the employees involved by
preventing discipline and making their work life more pleasant, and will assist
the union in building a more cohesive membership to maintain power vis-a-vis
the employer. Even if the dispute is not resolved, providing a forum for
employee voice may defuse the dispute and, in the long run, pay dividends in
other ways, such as improving solidarity among union members. To the extent
that legal disputes, such as duty of fair representation claims, disputes over the
union's use of dues, or claims ofunion discrimination, can be resolved fairly, the
union will benefit in the same way as the employer from low cost, quick,
interest-based settlement. 131

2. Benefits for Employees
Mediation would present employees the opportunity to resolve disputes
without litigation, in a forum which is voluntary and nonbinding. Their right to
litigate any legal claims would be preserved if no resolution was reached in
mediation. Thus, unlike arbitration, the employee would not have to forego any
rights and remedies except by voluntary agreement reached in mediation.

garment manufacturer to pay workers back w-:-, . ···:iaid by contractors and to create an
education fund and hotline for garment workers. Id. at 78-82. Also in California, the
nonprofit organization Labor Project for Working Families and the Service Employees
International Union obtained grant funding to create centers to provide support for home
health workers-social activities, a health clinic, immigration and legal advice, job
referrals and opportunities to meet with their union representatives. Id.
129. The union may be legally limited in its ability to waive employee rights where
there is a possible conflict of interest between the employees and the union. See, e.g.,
NLRB v. Magnavox Co., 415 U.S. 322, 325 (1974).
130. For additional discussion of issues unique to harassment, see infra Part Il.F.2.
131. For discussion of conflict issues arising in disputes between employees or
employees and the union, see infra Part 11.G. Some issues, such as discrimination, may
involve claims against both the employer and the union. For discussion of issues that
may arise in such cases, see Indira Talwani, Settlement and Mediation of Individual
Employment Disputes in the Unionized Workplace, in ABA SECTION OF LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT LAW, EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMIITEE, 2002 MIDWINTER
MEETING, PROGRAM MATERIALS (2002).
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Mediation may resolve legal disputes early and at low cost. 132 Such resolution
may prevent legal issues from escalating. In harassment cases, for example,
evidence indicates that many victims simply want the harassment to stop. 133
They do not want to sue their employer and desire to avoid the pain and publicity
of a trial, choosing litigation only as a last resort. A mediation forum provides
a more private method of dealing with the abuse.
In addition to legal claims, the mediation forum could provide an
opportunity to deal with other disputes not covered by contract or law. For
example, communication problems and interpersonal disputes often cause
significant conflict in the workforce which leads to lost productivity and low
morale. 134 These difficulties are not typically covered by the collective
bargaining agreement, although efforts might well be made by employees and
unions to fit them under the rubric of the grievance procedure to achieve
resolution. Mediation offers a forum to deal with such disputes without the need

132. In a small study of EEO mediation cases before a human rights agency, "early
and timely use of mediation ... appeared as a very significant factor in determining
disputants' degree of satisfaction" with both the process and outcome of mediation and
with the mediator's skills and abilities. Arup Varma & Lamont E. Stallworth,
Participants ' Satisfaction with EEO Mediation and the Issue of Legal Representation:
An Empirical Inquiry, 6 EMPLOYEE RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 387, 411 (2002).
133. See Kihnley, supra note 108, at 82 (reporting that individuals in universities
who handled sexual harassment complaints reported that many complainants simply want
harassment to cease); Mary P. Rowe, People who Feel Harassed Need a Complaint
System with Both Formal and Informal Options, 6 NEGOTIATION J. 161, 164-65 (1990)
(finding based on the author's experience as an ombudsperson dealing with
approximately six thousand persons over sixteen years that seventy-five percent or more
of complainants just want harassment to stop); Carrie A. Bond, Note, Shattering the
Myth: Mediating Sexual Harassment Disputes in the Workplace, 65 FORDHAM L. REV.
2489, 2501 (1997). Evidence also indicates, however, that many victims do not report
harassment, making mediation a less viable solution. See U.S. MERIT SYS. PROTECTION
Bo., SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE FEDERAL WORKPLACE: TRENDS, PROGRESS,
CONTINUING CHALLENGES 33 ( 1995) (finding in a survey of federal workers that only six
percent of workers who had suffered from sexual harassment reported their harassment);
Martha Chamallas, The New Gender Panic: Reflections on Sex Scandals and the
Military, 83 MINN. L. REV. 305, 305 (1998) (citing NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR REsEARCH
ON WOMEN, SEXUAL HARASSMENT: RESEARCH AND RESOURCES 10 (1995))(finding that
one to seven percent of women who report having suffered from harassment file a formal
complaint).
134. See Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Dispute Resolution in the Boundaryless
Workplace, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 467, 481 (2001) (suggesting the use of
mediation to resolve disputes relating to miscommunication and disputes where
"emotional factors or personality traits prevent parties from resolving differences
themselves"). Stone argues that a promise of fair treatment is necessary to recruit and
retain employees and to induce them to work cooperatively for the benefit of the
employer. Id. at 479-80.
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to attempt to structure the disagreement to meet the contractual definition of a
grievance. 135 Resolution of such disputes will improve workplace morale for
employees and may prevent future discipline problems. For the employees,
mediation would provide an opportunity to resolve disputes that previously had
no forum. 136
The solutions available in mediation are more flexible than in court, where
remedies are limited by the law. Mediation can provide for interest-based
solutions such as apologies, reassignment of employees or supervisors to
different jobs or departments, sensitivity or communication training, or simply
an end to certain behaviors. 137 Even in cases where employment has been
severed amid allegations of discrimination or other statutory violations,
reinstatement might be a viable solution in an early mediation where back pay
has not accumulated, positions have not hardened, and the union is present to
ease the renewal of the employment relationship. 138
Mediation may provide a better forum for resolving what Professor Susan
Sturm has called "second-generation" discrimination issues. 139 While intentional

135. In addition to mediation, the parties might consider whether other dispute
resolution methods that have been adopted in the nonunion workplace, such as ombuds
or peer review, would be useful. Dispute resolution scholars recommend procedures with
multiple options so that the forum fits the dispute. See, e.g., Mary Rowe, Dispute
Resolution in the Non-Union Environment, in WORKPLACE DISPUTE RESOLUTION, supra
note 42, at 79, 84.
136. While "workplace bullying" or harassment that does not come within the
statutory discrimination laws is probably not a widespread problem in the unionized
workplace due to union protections, mediation might offer a forum for such disputes if
not covered by the existing collective bargaining agreement. See David C. Yamada, The
Phenomenon of "Workplace Bullying" and the Need for Status-Blind Hostile Work
Environment Protection, 88 GEO. L.J. 475, 488-89 (2000) (noting that bullying is less
likely in the unionized workplace because of contractual protections and informal dispute
resolution efforts by the union, but citing example oflawsuit involving bullying ofunion
steward); see also Spartan Equip. Co., 297 N.L.R.B. 19, 19 (1989) (finding individual
employee's filing of criminal charge against employer to be protected concerted activity
because he was attempting to further his efforts to act as union spokesperson without
intimidation by the employer).
13 7. Interest-based solutions focus not on legal remedies available by right but on
resolutions that meet the interests of the parties. Of course, not all mediation is focused
on interests. Mediation can also focus on rights, and legal mediation often does. See
WILLIAM L. URY ET AL., GETTING DISPUTES RESOLVED 4-5 (1988).
138. Available evidence indicates that the reinstatement remedy works more
effectively in the unionized environment. See infra notes 249-50 and accompanying text.
Of course in any termination case there will inevitably be overlap with the just cause
provision of the collective bargaining agreement. For a discussion of the overlap issue,
see infra Part H.F.
139. Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural
Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458 (2001).

394

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69

discrimination certainly still exists, current discrimination often results from
unconscious bias which is embedded in workplace structures and patterns of
interaction over time. These structures and patterns exclude from higher paying
jobs women and other groups that have historically been subjected to
discrimination. Because the exclusion results from structural features rather than
intentional discrimination, it is difficult to challenge under existing legal
doctrines. 140 Professor Sturm suggests that various actors both within and
outside the workplace can play problem solving roles in changing workplace
structures that result in discriminatory exclusion or harassment. 141 She offers
several examples of such change, including one resulting from a mediated
settlement of a discrimination case against Home Depot brought by women. 142
The mediation forum, and the availability of the union as an additional interested
and knowledgeable actor, may facilitate resolution of discrimination issues that
resist conventional judicial solutions. 143
Perhaps most important, employees obtain the possibility of free or low cost
union representation in the mediation process. Representation is viewed as
fundamental to fairness in dispute resolution processes. 144 While employees
have many statutory rights, their ability to enforce these rights is limited by their

140. Id. at 465-78.
141. Id. at 479-537. As one example of such structures, she describes the hiring
and promotion procedures at Home Depot which used subjective decision-making in an
organization with a predominently male culture, resulting in exclusion of white women
and people of color from many jobs. Id. at 510-13; see also Yelnosky, supra note 116,
at 601-02 (citing reports of changes in workplace rules, policies and practices resulting
from mediation).
142. Sturm, supra note 139, at 509-19. The settlement created a new hiring and
promotion system to ensure consideration of white women, people of color and older
workers foralljobs. Id. at512-19.
143. See id. at 533-34 (describing the role of the Harvard Union of Clerical and
Technical Workers in creating joint councils to deal with workplace organization and
policy. Sturm also recounts the role of representatives of an employee organization in
crafting settlement of a race discrimination claim.). Notably, four often employers with
dispute resolution programs studied by the GAO indicated that such programs alerted
management to systemic concerns in the workplace, which in some cases led to changes
in company procedures and policies. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ALTERNATNE
DISPUTES RESOLUTION: EMPLOYERS' EXPERIENCES WITH ADR IN THE WORKPLACE 27
(1997) [hereinafter GAO REPORT].
144. See American Arbitration Association, Due Process Protocol for Mediation
and Arbitration ofStatutory Disputes Arising out ofthe Employment Relationship (May
9, 1995), available athttp://www.adr.org/index2. I .j sp? JSPssid= l 5769&JSPsrc=upload
\LIVESITE\Ru Jes_Procedures\Protocols\ .. \ .. \focusArea\emp Ioyment\protocol .html;
Bingham et al., supra note 99, at 346; Nancy A. Welsh, Making Deals in CourtConnected Mediation: What's Justice Got to Do with It?, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 787, 843-44
(2001 ).
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ability to expend the resources necessary to do so. Obtaining legal
representation is difficult for employees, other than highly-paid executives,
because of the cost relative to the remedy available. 145 And, as noted above,
even where the statute provides for employer-paid attorneys' fees for prevailing
employees, attorneys are reluctant to accept cases without strong evidence at the
outset that a victory is likely. 146 Such overwhelming evidence is rare, particularly
prior to discovery. As many scholars have noted, unions may help fill this
representation gap.
Union representation also helps balance power. 147 Rather than the lone
employee against the employer, the employee has the strength of the union on his
or her side. This assistance reduces the disadvantage to employees that might
result from the lack of institutional protections to minimize bias. 148 In some
situations, of course, the union may be of little assistance in this regard, as the
union itself may be a source of bias. 149 The option of other representation, such
as employee caucuses, outside social justice organizations or lawyers, will
provide an alternative to the employee desiring representation other than the

145. See William M. Howard, Arbitrating Employment Discrimination Claims:
Do You Really Have To? Do You Really Want To?, 43 DRAKE L. REV. 256, 288-89
(1994) (discussing the difficulties employees face in obtaining counsel); Maltby, supra
note 43, at 58 (same); St. Antoine, supra note 46, at 91 (same).
146. See supra notes 43-49 and accompanying text.
147. See National Labor Relations Act§ l, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2000). Empirical data
demonstrate that unionized employees are more likely than similar nonunion employees
to obtain benefits and enforce statutory rights. See John W. Budd & Brian P. McCall,
The Effect of Unions on the Receipt of Unemployment Insurance Benefits, 50 INDUS. &
LAB. REL. REV. 478, 488 (1997) (finding that unionized employees are more likely than
nonunion employees to collect unemployment compensation benefits, even after
controlling for differences in demographics, unemployment compensation systems, and
jobs); Barry T. Hirsch et al., Workers 'Compensation Recipiency in Union and Nonunion
Workplaces, 50 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 213, 218, 233 (1997) (finding that unionized
workers were more likely to file workers' compensation claims and more likely to receive
workers' compensation benefits); David Weil, Enforcing OSHA: The Role of Labor
Unions, 30 INDUS. REL. 20, 26-34 (1991) (finding that unions increase enforcement of
OSHA in the manufacturing sector, resulting in more frequent inspections, more
employee representation on inspections, more intense inspections, greater numbers of
violations found and greater penalties). Union status likely enhances the probability of
benefit receipt and statutory enforcement because the union provides information about
risks, rights and benefits, represents the employees, and offers protection from retaliation.
Budd & McCall, supra, at 490-91; Hirsch et al., supra, at 217, 233; Weil, supra, at 2022. In short, the empirical data suggest that unions improve the prospects for collecting
benefits by assisting employees in exercising their statutory rights.
148. See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
149. See Crain, Colorblind, supra note 53, at 1322-25 (discussing the role of
unions in exploitation of people of color); Crain & Matheny, supra note 53, at 1593-96
(discussing the role of the labor movement in the exploitation of women).
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union. 150 The presence of a knowledgeable and trained representative can
prevent the employee from being pressured into a settlement that inappropriately
waives legal rights.
The union's institutional memory can assist the employee in making her
case. 151 In many discrimination cases, for example, the most relevant evidence
may be the treatment of other employees similar to, and different from, the
plaintiff. While the plaintiff may have limited information about the employer's
treatment of other employees, the union has far more information and may even
be able to persuade other employees to provide evidentiary support for the
plaintiff. 152 This information will assist in negotiating a favorable settlement for
the plaintiff/employee.

3. Benefits for Employers
One question regarding a recommendation for an additional forum for
employee complaints is why an employer should agree to such a forum. One
answer is that many employers are already offering mediation unilaterally. 153

150. See infra notes 314-18 and accompanying text. In the nonunion ADR
program at TRW, a diversified manufacturing company, employees used attorneys in
about half of the cases, but in others employees brought other representatives, such as
spouses and, in one case, a priest. Alexander J.S. Colvin, Adoption and Use of Dispute
Resolution Procedures in the Nonunion Workplace 28 (2003) (unpublished manuscript,
on file with the author). A report on the program indicated that in many cases these nonattorney representatives were forceful advocates for the employee. Id.
151. See Talwani, supra note 131, at 6. The union can provide this assistance even
where it is not representing the employee.
152. The plaintiff may have rumors or hearsay information at best, but the union
may have grievance records, union stewards who represented employees in grievances,
or greater access to the employees themselves, who may be more willing to share their
stories at the urging of the union.
153. A 1997 Cornell University study surveyed corporate counsel from the one
thousand largest United States corporations about ADR. David B. Lipsky & Ronald L.
Seeber, In Search ofControl: The Corporate Embrace ofADR, I U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP.
L. 133 ( 1998) [hereinafter Lipsky & Seeber, In Search of Controlj. Eighty-eight percent
of respondents reported using mediation at least once in the previous three years. Id. at
137. Eighty-four percent indicated that they were likely or very likely to use mediation
in the future. Id. at 153. And the survey indicated that mediation was being used in
almost every industry. Id. at 157. More specific data on employment disputes from the
same study reveal that mediation is used more often in employment disputes than any
other category, and that industries across the board prefer mediation to other forms of
ADR for resolution of employment disputes. See David B. Lipsky & Ronald L. Seeber,
Patterns of ADR Use in Corporate Disputes, DISP. RESOL. J., Feb. 1999, at 66, 68, 69
[hereinafter Lipsky & Seeber, Patterns]. Further, survey respondents predicted that the
use of mediation in employment disputes would grow significantly. DAVID B. LIPSKY &
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Whether the motive is altruistic or self-serving, employer-sponsored mediation
is becoming more widely available. 154 The most probable motive of employers
adopting mediation is avoiding the cost and publicity of litigation, and perhaps
also improving workforce morale and thereby productivity. 155 Indeed, some
evidence suggests that unionized workers, and particularly union activists, are
more likely to assert statutory rights. 156 If that is the case, then a mediation
program for statutory rights may be of particular benefit to unionized employers.
Those employers who have utilized internal mediation or ombuds programs
frequently report satisfactory results. 157 Disputes are resolved more quickly and

RONALD L. SEEBER, THEAPPROPRIATE RESOLUTION OF CORPORATE DISPUTES: A REPORT
ON THE GROWING USE OF ADR BY U.S. CORPORATIONS 30 (1998).
154. See Lipsky& Seeber,/n Search ofControl, supra note 153, at 137, 153, 157;
Margaret L. Shaw, Designing and Implementing In-House Dispute Resolution Programs,
in ALl-ABA COURSE OF STUDY, ALTERNATNE DISPUTE RESOLUTION (ADR): How TO
USE IT TO YouR ADVANTAGE! ( 1999) (listing mediation programs of a number oflarge
employers including McGraw-Hill, Halliburton (formerly Brown & Root), Polaroid,
TRW and Shen Oil).
155. In a survey of corporate counsel, cost and time savings were identified as the
primary reasons for using mediation. Lipsky & Seeber, In Search ofControl, supra note
153, at 138. In addition, corporations were motivated to use mediation by the control it
provided over resolution of the dispute, the satisfactory nature of the process and
settlements reached, and the preservation of good relationships achieved from resolving
disputes through mediation. Id. at 139.
156. See Budd & Mccan, supra note 147, at 488, 490-91 (finding that union
employees are more likely than nonunion employees to receive unemployment
compensation benefits); Hirsch et al., supra note 147, at 218, 233 (finding that union
employees are more likely to receive workers' compensation benefits); Michele Hoyman
& Lamont Stanworth, Suit Filing by Women: An Empirical Analysis, 62 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 61, 77 (1986) (finding a correlation between union activism and filing of
lawsuits); Michele M. Hoyman & Lamont E. Stanworth, Who Files Suits and Why: An
Empirical Portrait of the Litigious Worker, 1981 U. ILL. L. REV. 115, 134-36 (finding
that both union activism and grievance filing were positively associated with filing of
lawsuits and discrimination charges); David Weil, Employee Rights, Unions and the
Implementation of Labor Policies, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE FORTY-FIFTH ANNUAL
MEETING, INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS RESEARCH Ass 'N 4 74, 4 76 ( 1993) (analyzing various
studies and concluding that unions improve enforcement of various laws, including the
Fair Labor Standards Act, OSHA, MSHA, certain provisions of ERISA, workers'
compensation laws and unemployment compensation laws); Weil, supra note 14 7, at 2634 (finding that unions increase OSHA enforcement).
157. See GAO REPORT,supra note 143, at 3 (reporting positive experiences with
ADR by an five private employers and four of five federal agencies studied, with
mediation proving most effective in resolving disputes); Colvin, supra note 150, at 27
(describing management satisfaction with mediation program at TRW, which resolved
disputes quickly and at low cost); Shaw, supra note 154 (reporting on Hughes Aircraft
and Brown & Root multi-step dispute resolution programs where employee claims were
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at lower cost. Resolution may be achieved before positions harden or actions are
taken that make resolution more difficult. 158 Resolution can be based on interests
rather than legal rights alone, potentially creating a long-term solution and
avoiding recurring problems. 159 In addition, participants in mediation, including
supervisors and managers, may improve their problem solving skills. As a
consequence future disputes, including both contractual grievances and
noncontractual disputes, may be reduced or resolved more quickly. 16° For these
reasons, mediation has greater potential than arbitration or litigation for
preserving the ongoing relationship of employer and employees. Since
unionized workplaces generally have lower turnover than nonunion
workplaces, 161 preserving relationships is particularly important for the
productivity of the work force. Although the employer is providing a forum for
disputes where none previously existed, the benefit of improved morale, greater
productivity and more effective resolution of all disputes may outweigh the cost
of providing the forum and spending employee, employer and union time on
resolution. 162
Furthermore, advocates of workplace dispute resolution programs point out
that successful programs include input from stakeholders, such as employees, in

resolved quickly to employees' satisfaction at early steps in the process, saving the
employers legal fees); see also Jeanne M. Brett et al., The Effectiveness of Mediation:
An Independent Analysis of Cases Handled by Four Major Service Providers, 12
NEGOTIATION J. 259 ( 1996) (finding that mediation settled seventy-eight percent of cases
and was cheaper, quicker and more satisfactory to the parties than arbitration because of
greater opportunities for voice and outcome control).
158. See GAO REPORT, supra note 143, at 4, 26; Aimee Gourlay & Jenelle
Soderquist, Mediation in Employment Cases Is Too Little Too Late: An Organizational
Conflict Management Perspective on Resolving Disputes, 21 HAMLINE L. REV. 261, 26465 (1998) (noting that while mediation can resolve disputes after lawsuits or
administrative charges are filed, earlier conflict resolution enhances the benefits of
mediation for preserving relationships and preventing future conflict).
159. Shaw, supra note 154 (reporting that Hughes Electronics Corporation saw the
focus on underlying interests as a key to program success).
160. See Jonathan F. Anderson & Lisa Bingham, Upstream Effects from Mediation
of Workplace Disputes: Some Preliminary Evidence from the USPS, 48 LAB. L.J. 601,
609-10 (1997); Goldberg, supra note 95, at 12-13.
161. RICHARD B. FREEMAN & JAMES L. MEDOFF, WHAT Do UNIONS Do?, at 20-21
(1984).
162. Shaw, supra note 154 (reporting that both Brown & Root and TRW noted
that, contrary to expectations, their ADR programs did not result in excessive complaints
or abuse by"chronic complainers"). Moreover, some disputes subject to mediation were
probably filed in the grievance procedure previously, whether or not they fit the formal
definition of a grievance. Thus, the mediation procedure may merely shift costs from one
forum to another.
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the system design. 163 The union provides a vehicle for such input, increasing the
chances that the mediation system will achieve its goals.
The EEOC has recently established a pilot program that allows employers
with preapproved ADR programs the first opportunity to resolve discrimination
complaints filed with the agency. 164 The ADR program must be wellestablished, voluntary and free. 165 It must incorporate statutory claims subject
to EEOC enforcement and include judicially enforceable written settlements. 166
Under the program, the agency, at the option of the charging party, will give the
parties sixty days to resolve the dispute using the existing internal program. A
mediation program with union representation might appeal to the EEOC for
inclusion in its new program. The employer could avoid the time and cost
necessary to respond to the EEOC investigation if the complaint is settled
internally. In addition, as the program's efficacy is established, employees might
opt for mediation prior to filing an EEOC charge.
If, as argued above, a mediation forum for noncontractual disputes offers
potential for strengthening the union by including individuals who may feel
estranged, the resulting increase in union power may suggest that employers
should avoid such mediation. The countervailing advantage to the employer,
however, is that mediation provides an opportunity to resolve issues relating to
gender, race, and ethnicity that might ultimately lead to litigation. As noted
above, even ifthe issues do not result in lawsuits against the employer, festering
problems among the workers or between workers and supervisors may reduce
morale and productivity. While employee dissatisfaction with the union may
ultimately redound to the employer's benefit in some cases, often it will cause
difficulties for the employer as well as the union. It may be difficult for the
union to resolve matters with the employer if the union is faced with revolt in
employee ranks, even where the dissatisfied are merely a vocal minority of

163. Gourlay & Soderquist, supra note 158, at 278; Rowe, supra note 135, at 85;
Sylvia Skratek, Conflictive Partnerships Under Collective Bargaining: A Neutral 's
Perspective, in WORKPLACE DISPUTE RESOLUTION, supra note 42, at 57, 70 (urging
meetings with unions and employers early in design process); John W. Zinsser,
Employment Dispute Resolution Systems: Experience Grows but Some Questions
Persist, 12 NEGOTIATION J. 151, 162 (1992) (describing Brown & Root's dispute
resolution system and noting the importance of involving employees in system design
early in the process); FMCS Exploring Dispute Systems Design to Meet Emergent
Workplace Conflicts, 41 Gov 't Empl. Rel. Rep. (BN A) No. 2026 (Sept. 23, 2003) (noting
that FMCS is working to bring workers and managers to the table to discuss system
design because the parties must be involved in establishing a system that works in the
organizational culture).
164. EEOC Launches Pilot ADR Referral Program for Pre-Approved Employers
in Philadelphia, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 57, at A-1 (Mar. 25, 2003).
165. Id.
166. Id.
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employees. 167 Thus, the contractual grievance process may become saturated.
Time spent on grievances or even informal griping is time not spent on
production. The union may be forced to arbitrate more grievances. And where
the union fails to do so, legal actions against both the employer and the union
may result. Thus, the employer should carefully consider whether disruption in
the relationship between the workers and the union truly advantages the
employer. In fact, a mechanism for resolution of such disputes may benefit the
employer as well as the union.

4. Empirical Evidence
One significant example of the use of mediation to resolve noncontractual
claims in the unionized workplace is the system adopted at the United States
Postal Service, one of the largest unionized employers in the country. 168 The
mediation program, known as REDRESS, offers voluntary mediation of
employment discrimination disputes. 169 The program uses "transformative
mediation," which has a goal of transforming individuals by assisting them in
dealing with conflict. 170 Transformative mediation seeks to promote parties'
control over their own dispute and to empower them to make decisions. 171 It also
encourages each party to mediation to recognize the needs and interests of the
other party. 172 Research indicates participant satisfaction with both the process
and the outcome. 173 In addition, the conflict management skills of supervisors
participating in mediation have improved. 174 Evidence from preliminary studies

167. Of course, ifa majority of employees are dissatisfied, it is likely that either the
union leadership will be defeated in the legally required elections or the union will be
decertified as the employees' representative at the next available opportunity.
168. Lisa B. Bingham, Exploring the Role of Representation in Employment
Mediation at the USPS, 17 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 341, 355-56 (2002). Although
it is a public employer, the Postal Service is covered by the National Labor Relations Act.
See 39 U.S.C. §§ 1202-1203, 1208-1209 (2000). In 2002, 72.5 percent of Postal Service
employees were covered by collective bargaining agreements. BARRY T. HIRSCH &
DAVID MACPHERSON, UNION MEMBERSHIP AND EARNINGS DATA BOOK: COMPILATIONS
FROM THE CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY 17 (2002). The mediation system is available
to all employees, including supervisors and managers who do not have the right to
unionize but may belong to associations which provide representational services in
mediation. Bingham, supra, at 358.
169. Bingham, supra note 168, at 355.
170. Id. at 356.
171. Id. at 356-57.
172. Anderson & Bingham, supra note 160, at 602.
173. Bingham, supra note 168, at 357.
174. Anderson & Bingham, supra note 160, at 607-09; Bingham, supra note 168,
at 357. A much smaller percentage of employees also reported that mediation changed
how they handled conflict. Anderson & Bingham, supra note 160, at 607.
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established that a significant percentage of participants felt both empowerment
and recognition by the other party. 175 Like the system recommended here,
employees in the REDRESS program are permitted to choose their own
representative, who may be a lawyer, coworker, union representative, friend, or
family member. 176
An analysis of the role of representation in the REDRESS process
demonstrated that settlement was more likely when the complainant/employee
was represented. 177 Researchers speculated that representation might balance
power and thereby make settlement more likely. 17 s Representation of claimants
also extended the length of mediation. 179 The parties settled most often when the
complainant was represented by a union representative and least often when the
complainant's representative was an attorney. 1so
Both complainants and respondents reported high levels of satisfaction with
the fairness of the REDRESS mediation process. 1s1 Ninety-one percent of
complainants represented by union representatives reported being very satisfied

175. Anderson & Bingham, supra note 160, at 609-10.
176. Bingham, supra note 168, at 358.
177. Id. at 361. The data did not distinguish between types ofrepresentatives. Id.
178. Id. at 362. Mediation theorists argue that equality of power makes settlement
more likely. Id. It is possible, however, that the types of cases in which the parties chose
to bring representatives were different, affecting the settlement rate. Id.
179. Id. at 363. The range between the longest and shortest mediation sessions was
only forty-seven minutes, however. Id.
180. Id. at 365-66. The data does not reveal whether the settlement was
substantively positive from the employee's point of view. Id.
Association
representatives for supervisors and managers also made settlement more likely. Id.
Unlike attorneys for complainants, however, attorney representation for supervisors and
managers did not render settlement least likely (as compared to no representation or
representation by another person such as a family member or friend). Id. at 366.
Researchers speculated that the specialized knowledge and experience of the Postal
Service attorneys might contribute to settlement or that the type of case in which the
employer deemed such representation necessary might be different. Id. In another study
of representation in mediation, the researchers found that attorney representation in
mediation was not correlated with greater satisfaction with mediation. Varma &
Stallworth, supra note 132, at 402-03, 413. In fact, those represented by attorneys were
generally less satisfied, except with the mediation process itself. Id. at 402-03, 413, 415.
The study, which contained only forty-seven participants, looked only at attorney
representation, not representation by nonlawyers, and contained responses from both
charging parties and respondents. Id. at 397. The authors suggest that the lower
satisfaction rate may be explained by tension between participants and their attorneys.
Id. at 413-14.
181. Bingham, supra note 168, at 367-68. Ninety percent of complainants and
ninety-three percent of respondents were either very satisfied or somewhat satisfied. Id.
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or somewhat satisfied with the fairness of the process. 182 An equal percentage
of employees without representation reported satisfaction, with a slightly higher
percentage indicating they were very satisfied with the fairness of the process. 183
Not surprisingly, complainants were most satisfied with their own participation
level in mediation where they had no representative, but only slightly less
satisfied with their own participation when represented by the union. 184
The majority of the issues mediated in the REDRESS program involved
parties in ongoing relationships rather than employment terminations. 185 Most
of the settlements were noneconomic and they frequently involved apologies and
agreements to modify communication methods in the future. 186 Researchers
suggested that attorneys might be associated with a lower settlement rate due to
their desire to "create a cash pool from which to recover attorneys' fees." 187
They surmised that union officials' status as repeat players with experience
dealing with management might explain their higher settlement rate. 188
Alternatively, it is possible that complainants used attorneys in cases that were
"stronger on the merits, more contentious and complex" and correspondingly
less likely to settle in mediation. 189
The REDRESS program is the closest program to that suggested here that
has been subjected to research and analysis. While there is more research to be
done, the preliminary results suggest positive effects from union representation
in internal EEO mediation for both the employee and the employer. 190 As noted

182. Id. at 368-69. Seventy-six percent of those represented by attorneys reported
similar satisfaction. Id.
183. Id. For respondents the satisfaction level was highest with attorney
representation (ninety-five percent) and only slightly lower with association
representation (ninety-four percent) or no representation (ninety-four percent). Id.
184. Ninety-seven percent of employees reported being very satisfied or somewhat
satisfied with their own participation level when they represented themselves, while
ninety-six percent indicated similar satisfaction levels with union representation. Id. at
371. With a lawyer, the satisfaction level was ninety-two percent. Id.
185. Id. at 372. But see Colvin, supra note 150, at 27 (describing successful
mediation program at TRW, which included cases oflayoff and wrongful discharge, and
noting that reinstatement of employees was a part of the settlement in some cases).
186. Bingham, supra note 168, at 372-73. The TRW mediation program also
included a number of non-monetary remedies including reinstatement of discharged
employees, changes in application of policies, and employee transfers within the
company. Colvin, supra note 150, at 27.
187. Bingham, supra note 168, at 372. In Professor Ellen Dannin's study of
mediation in New Zealand, she found that increasing use oflawyers also added to delay
in the mediation process. See Ellen J. Dannin, Contracting Mediation: The Impact of
Different Statutory Regimes, 17 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 65, 105, 108 (1999).
188. Bingham, supra note 168, at 372.
189. Id. at 375.
190. Id. at 376-77.
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above, empirical research on grievance mediation also indicates high settlement
rates and high party satisfaction rates, as well as improved ability to resolve
future disputes. 191
Research on civil legal mediation suggests some caution in optimism about
mediation's ability to repair relationships, however. Professor Dwight Golann
surveyed mediators to determine how frequently such repairs occurred, limiting
his survey to cases where the parties had a prior relationship and a legal claim
had been either filed or threatened. 192 A relationship repair was effectuated in
only seventeen percent of the cases. 193 In thirty percent of the cases, the
settlement included at least one noneconomic term. 194 Given that repair of
relationships and interest-based settlement are two touted values of mediation,
one might have expected a higher rate of both. While this is a relatively low rate
of repair, it is interesting to note that Professor Golann excluded mediation in
unionized workplaces because he believed that the incentive to repair
relationships would be significantly greater there than in other civil disputes and
inclusion might bias the results. 195
While no empirical test of the factors that influence repair of relationships
was incorporated in the study, the survey asked the mediators what factors
affected the possibility of relationship repair. 196 The four factors mentioned were
the value of the renewed relationship as compared to litigation or separation, the
timing of mediation in the progress of the dispute, the attitudes of the parties and
their representatives, and whether the mediator had a chance to begin to prepare
the parties for a possible repair before the actual mediation session. 197 The
REDRESS program is an example of a mediation where relationship repairs

191. See Elkiss, supra note 90, at 677-80; Feuille, supra note 5, at 190-92;
Goldberg & Brett, supra note 91, at 26, 27, 28; Skratek,supra note 163, at 63-65; supra
notes 93-96 and accompanying text. The high settlement rate in grievance mediation is
particularly impressive given that it is a later step in the grievance process. It is probable
that cases where settlement could be reached easily were resolved in the earlier steps of
the grievance procedure.
192. Dwight Golann, Is Legal Mediation a Process ofRepair-Or Separation? An
Empirical Study, and its Implications, 7 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 301, 303-06 (2002).
193. Id. at 311. A repair was defined as a plan for an ongoing relationship. Id. at
313. In seven cases, the mediator believed there had been a reconciliation, a willingness
to continue to relate voluntarily, which included situations where there was no specific
plan for future relations. Id. at 313-14.
194. Id. at 314. Confidentiality clauses and liability releases were not considered
noneconomic terms. Id. at 308-09. Noneconomic terms in employment cases included
a letter of reference, a change in the employment file, an apology, a noncompetition
agreement, and an agreement not to reapply for employment. Id. at 315.
195. Id. at 320.
196. Id. at 318.
197. Id.
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were more likely because the employees viewed the postal service as their
lifetime career, thus providing an incentive to negotiate a satisfactory resolution
that allowed parties to continue to work together. 198
In the family law area, the collaborative law movement suggests that
mediation outside the context of litigation can preserve relationships. 199
Collaborative lawyers agree to represent clients only for purposes of settlement
discussion, eschewing litigation. 200 If litigation occurs, the lawyer must
withdraw and his or her firm cannot participate in the litigation. 201 Collaborative
lawyers have formed networks around the country and report anecdotally that
settlement in many cases comes more quickly, cheaply and with less rancor, both
in settlement discussions and subsequently. 202 While evidence of use of
collaborative law in employment is rare, the importance of ongoing relationships
has resulted in recommendations that expansion of the movement into the
employment law field might be appropriate. 203
In addition to the literature on mediation, the empirical evidence from the
REDRESS program, as well as grievance mediation, suggests that a mediation
program for noncontractual disputes in the union workplace may provide
benefits to all parties. The two programs use two different models of mediation.
The section below analyzes the two models to determine which might be most
suited to noncontractual disputes.

198. Id. at 320.
199. Elaine McArdle, Divorce Without the Bloodshed, LAWYERS WEEKLY USA,
Apr. 3, 2000, available athttp://www.Jawyersweeklyusa.com/reprints/collaborative.htm.
200. James K.L. Lawrence, Collaborative Lawyering: A New Development in
Conflict Resolution, 17 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 431, 432 (2002). Critics suggest that
a collaborative Jaw attorney might have an incentive to encourage a Jess desirable
settlement to avoid failure of the process, and consequent inability to obtain fees. Id. at
433.
20 I. Id. at 433-34.
202. See Lawrence, supra note 200, at 432 (describing Collaborative Law Center
in Cincinnati, Ohio, and suggesting that collaborative lawyering helps maintain
relationships); McArdle,supranote 199; The Advocates Network, A Collaborative Law
Network oflndependent Professionals, athttp://www.advocatesnetwork.com (last visited
Apr. 15, 2004); Collaborative Law Section, athttp://www.mediate.com/collaborativelaw
(last visited Apr. 15, 2004) (archiving and summarizing various articles on collaborative
Jaw); Hamline University School of Law Dispute Resolution Institute, Collaborative Law
Section, at http://www.hamline.edu/law/adr (last visited Apr. 15, 2004) (archiving and
summarizing various articles on collaborative law); Massachusetts Collaborative Law
Council, at http://www.massclc.org (last visited Apr. 15, 2004) (describing benefits of
collaborative Jaw and identifying attorneys practicing in the field).
203. See Lawrence, supra note 200, at 433; Massachusetts Collaborative Law
Council, supra note 202, at http://www.massclc.org/employment.htm.
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D. Choosing the Type of Mediation
1. Transfonnative Versus Transactional Mediation
There is widespread agreement among mediation scholars that at least two
different types of mediation exist. While denomination of the two types varies,
one type may be described as transactional and the other as transformative. 204
Broadly described, the goal of transactional mediation is settlement. 205 In
transactional mediation, the mediator facilitates discussion of the issues and
assists the parties in their efforts to resolve their dispute. Many scholars also
divide transactional mediation into two types. In one form, most often used for
rights-based disputes, the mediator's evaluation of how the dispute might be
decided in court or arbitration is an important component. 206 The mediator
typically is chosen for subject matter expertise. The other form of transactional
mediation eschews evaluation, instead focusing on interest-based negotiation
techniques to facilitate settlement.
The mediator tries to encourage
communication between the parties to enable the parties to craft their own
settlement. This form of mediation has been denominated "facilitative" or
"process-oriented. " 207
In transformative mediation, pioneered by Robert Baruch Bush and Joseph
Folger, the primary goals are empowerment of the parties and recognition by
each party of the other's concerns. 208 To empower the parties, the mediator

204. Robert A. Baruch Bush, Handling Workplace Conflict: Why Transformative
Mediation?, 18 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 367, 368, 368 n.4 (2001).
205. The following general description of the two types of mediation is derived
from EDWARD BRUNET & CHARLES B. CRAVER, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION:
THE ADVOCATE'$ PERSPECTIVE 188-92 (2d ed. 2001), Lisa B. Bingham & Lisa-Marie
Napoli, Employment Dispute Resolution and Workplace Culture: The REDRESS
Program at the United States Postal Service, in FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE DISPUTE
RESOLUTION DESKBOOK, supra note 108, at 507, 519-24, and Bush, supra note 204, at
368-70.
206. This form of mediation might be called "evaluative," Bingham & Napoli,
supra note 205, at 519, "substance-oriented," BRUNET & CRAVER, supra note 205, at
193-94, or "information centered," Norman Brand, Learning to Use the Mediation
Process-A Guide for Lawyers, ARB. J., Dec. 1992, at6, 8-12.
207. See BRUNET & CRAVER, supra note 205, at 195-97 (describing "processoriented" mediation); Bingham & Napoli, supra note 205, at 519 (describing mediation
without an evaluative component or mediation where the evaluation comes only at the
end of the process of interest-based negotiation, as "facilitative"). Norman Brand calls
this types of transactional mediation "process centered mediation." Brand, supra note
206, at 8-12. In process-oriented mediation, the mediator is chosen for expertise in
dispute resolution. Id.
208. Bush and Folger introduced transformative mediation in the 1994 book, The
Promise ofMediation. ROBERT A. BARUCH BUSH & JOSEPH P. FOLGER, THE PROMISE OF
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allows the parties to control the process by setting their own ground rules,
proffering their concerns, and making their own decisions. The mediator's
primary role is to ask questions to ensure comfort, control, and adequate
resources, and to make comments, helping the parties see when recognition of
the other parties' concerns has occurred. One of the long-term goals of
transformative mediation is to assist the parties in improving their ability to
resolve future disputes, thereby changing organizational culture. Settlement is
a common byproduct, but not the primary goal, of transformative mediation.
Of the two examples of workplace mediation discussed earlier, one, the
REDRESS program, uses transformative mediation, while grievance mediation
is commonly transactional or settlement-oriented. 209 The REDRESS program
chose the transformative model in a deliberate effort to change the workplace
culture. 210 Early evaluations suggest that the parties to mediation, supervisors
and employees alike, believe that they are better able to resolve conflicts as a
result of their participation in mediation. 211 In addition, both the number of
informal complaints and the number of disputes proceeding to the formal
complaint stage have been reduced. 212 Although settlement is not an explicit
goal, full or partial settlement is reached in sixty-three to sixty-four percent of
cases mediated. 213 Eighty percent of cases are closed, which includes settlement
during or after mediation, cases where the complainant withdrew the complaint,
and those where the complainant did not proceed to the next step of the
process. 214 Employees and supervisors report high levels of satisfaction with the
process (ninety percent), and relatively high levels of satisfaction with the

MEDIATION: RESPONDING TO CONFLICT TuROUGH EMPOWERMENT AND RECOGNITION
(1994). Brunet and Craver call transfonnative mediation ''relationship-oriented"
mediation. BRUNET & CRAVER, supra note 205, at 190-92. Earlier, Raymond Shonholtz
utilized a similar type of mediation with empowerment as the primary goal in his work
with neighborhood justice systems. See STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG ET AL., DISPUTE
RESOLUTION 348 (I 985); Raymond Shonholtz, Neighborhood Justice Systems: Work,
Structure, and Guiding Principles, 5 MEDIATION Q. 3, 10-11, 13-16 (1984),reprinted in
GOLDBERG ET AL., supra, at 364-67.
209. Grievance mediation uses an evaluation, but only late in the process, after
initial settlement efforts have failed. See supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text.
210. Hallberlin, supra note 107, at 378.
211. Id. at 377, 380; Tina Nabatchi & Lisa B. Bingham, Transformative Mediation
in the USPS REDRESS & TM Program: Observations ofADR Specialists, 18 HOFSTRA
LAB. & EMP. L.J. 399, 402 (2001).
212. Hallberlin, supra note 107, at 380. Under the complaint procedure, formal
complaints are filed when the complaint is not resolved at the informal stage. Id. Formal
complaints require investigation and may lead to trial. Id.
213. Bingham, supra note 168, at 364.
214. Id. at 364-65.
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outcomes (sixty-five to seventy percent). 215 The Postal Service has trained about
three thousand mediators around the country in the transformative mediation
process, 216 creating a group of mediators that would also be available for other
transformative mediation programs.
Because of the reported success of the REDRESS program, which seeks to
mediate noncontractual disputes in a unionized environment, it provides an
appealing model. The Postal Service is in some ways a unique environment,
however. It is one of the largest civilian employers in the world. 217 The number
of EEO complaints was about fourteen thousand per year before the REDRESS
program was implemented. 218 The very size of the organization and the number
of EEO cases could justify a substantial investment in a mediation program.
Moreover, although it operates as a "serniprivatized independent establishment
of the executive branch," 219 the level of job security is higher than most private
businesses and most employees expect to spend their career with the postal
service. 220 Thus, both management and employees are likely to view as
worthwhile the investment in transforming culture and repairing relationships.
Transactional mediation is most often used in grievance mediation, 221
although the parties to such mediations, the union and the employer, will have
an ongoing relationship governed by the collective bargaining agreement.
Grievance mediations involve contractual rights under the collective bargaining
agreement, although the mediation may reveal underlying interests that are the
real source of the problem. 222 The genius of mediation is the ability to focus on
such interests. Similarly, many of the disputes in the REDRESS program were
phrased in terms of rights, primarily EEO issues. Yet in the transformative
mediation process, the resolution often focused not so much on rights, but on
interests. 223 Both the REDRESS program and grievance mediation programs
show some evidence of changing workplace culture and improving the ability of

215. Hallberlin, supra note 107, at 380.
216. Gann & Hallberlin, supra note 108, at 627.
217. Nabatchi & Bingham, supra note 211, at 403.
218. Hallberlin, supra note 107, at 380.
219. Bingham & Napoli, supra note 205, at 510.
220. Golann, supra note 192, at 320.
221. Peter Feuille, Dispute Resolution Frontiers in the Unionized Workplace, in
WORKPLACE DISPUTE RESOLUTION, supra note 42, at 17, 36; Skratek, supra note 163, at
64.
222. Goldberg, supra note 95, at 10-11.
223. See James R. Antes et al., Transforming Conflict Interactions in the
Workplace: Documented Effects ofthe USPS REDRESS TM Program, 18 HOFSTRA LAB.
& EMP. L.J. 429, 435-52 (2001) (summarizing sixteen REDRESS mediations). As
proposed here, the mediation program would include not only legal issues, but also
disputes that involved neither contractual nor legal rights. Such disputes necessarily
focus on interests.
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the parties to resolve their own disputes. 224 Perhaps either system would achieve
positive results in the unionized environment. A further look at these two forms
of mediation in relation to the advantages of the mediation program discussed
above may shed more light on the choice of mediation format. 225
For the employer, the primary advantages were resolution of disputes that
might otherwise be litigated and improvements in the ability of supervisors and
employees to resolve disputes without formal processes. These benefits accrue
to the employees and the union as well. Evidence from the REDRESS program
demonstrates high settlement rates from use of the transformative model,
although settlement is not the primary goal. 226 In addition, there is evidence of
improvement in the parties' ability to resolve disputes. 227 Grievance mediation,
with its evaluative component, also has a high settlement rate 228 and evidence

224. See supra notes 94-96, 173-75, 211-12 and accompanying text.
225. Most of the focus will be on the REDRESS program and grievance mediation
because they resemble most closely the program recommended here. The presence of the
union generally creates a more stable workforce because ofbenefits like seniority and job
security. Employees who have protection from termination without just cause are more
likely to file complaints while still employed. The upstream benefits, like relationship
preservation and repair and improvement in dispute resolution skills, will be more
important in a stable workforce. Nevertheless, some data from mediation in the nonunion
workplace will be reviewed also.
226. See Bingham & Pitts, supra note 108, at 143-44 (citing research findings that
"implementation of REDRESS corresponded to a statistically significant drop in formal
EEO complaints of more than seventeen percent annually''); Successes of Employment
Resolution Through Mediation Discussed at ABA Meeting, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No.
85, at A-4 (May 2, 2001) (citing REDRESS program closure rates of seventy-eight
percent in 2000 and eighty percent in 2001, and a twenty-eight percent decrease in cases
filed between fiscal years 1998 and 2001 ); supra notes 213-14 and accompanying text.
A small pilot study of mediation in several state agencies in Ohio also found a high
resolution rate for cases that went to mediation. See Hebert, supra note 107, at 434
(reporting eight ofnine mediated disputes resolved). The mediated cases were primarily
EEO disputes and interpersonal conflicts. Id. at 426-27. The study did not specifically
report whether the mediation format was evaluative or facilitative and reports of mediator
behaviors were conflicting, although there were some reports of evaluative conduct. See
id. at 433. Some employees apparently were unionized but no information regarding the
role of the union was reported, except that efforts were made to educate the union about
mediation and there were some indications that the union was supportive. Id. at 425,
427, 429. The small sample limits the ability to generalize from the study, however. Id.
at446.
227. See Successes ofEmployment Resolution, supra note 226 (citing twenty-eight
percent decrease in cases filed at Postal Service between fiscal years 1998 and 2001);
supra notes 211-12 and accompanying text.
228. See Goldberg, supra note 95, at 12 (citing settlement rates both inside and
outside the coal industry of approximately eighty percent); supra note 96 and
accompanying text.
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shows later benefits in problem solving ability. 229 As noted above, although
limited evidence regarding mediation of legal claims suggests that repair of
relationships rarely results, 230 the study excluded mediation in unionized
workplaces. The ongoing relationship of the union and the employer can provide
both incentive and ability to repair relationships.
Evaluations of employer mediation programs also reveal high settlement
rates. 231 Additionally, a survey of private employers about ADR use indicated
that many choose mediation because it preserves good relationships. 232 Several
employers have indicated that dispute resolution programs improved
management and supervision. 233 While governmental discrimination agency
programs do not collect data on post-mediation relationships, they, like employer
programs, have achieved substantial settlement rates. In the EEOC's pilot
mediation program, the settlement rate was fifty-two percent. 234 A later
evaluation of the EEOC's program based on a survey of mediation participants
showed that the cases of fifty-six percent of charging parties and sixty-one
percent of respondents had been resolved at the time of response. 235 The
Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination's mediation program for
civil rights cases resolved sixty-three percent of mediated cases. 236

229. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
230. See supra note 193 and accompanying text.
231. See GAO REPORT, supra note 143, at 3 (reporting that mediation had high
settlement rates in nine of ten employer programs studied); Colvin, supra note 150, at 262 7 (describing AD R program at TRW, where only three of seventy-two mediated claims
in the first three years of the program went to arbitration, all others being either settled
or dropped during or after mediation); Homer C. La Rue, The Changing Workplace
Environment in the New Millennium: ADR is a Dominant Trend in the Workplace, 2000
COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 453, 499 n.58 (describing seventy percent settlement rate of cases
in mediation at United Parcel Service); see also Shaw, supra note 154 (reporting on high
resolution rates in the pre-hearing stages of dispute resolution programs at Hughes
Aircraft and Brown & Root).
232. LIPSKY & SEEBER, supra note 153, at 18.
233. GAO REPORT, supra note 143, at45,48, 56; Colvin, supra note 150, at28-29
(indicating that quicker resolution of disputes resulting from mediation enabled the
employer to identify and remedy management problems more quickly, preventing further
harm to the company).
234. MCDERMOTT ET AL., supra note 110.
235. Id. ch. 6. Twenty-six percent of charging parties and nineteen percent of
respondents had not completed their mediation at the time of the survey, however. Id.
236. Thomas A. Kochan et al., An Evaluation of the Massachusetts Commission
Against Discrimination Alternative Dispute Resolution Program, 5 HARV. NEGOT. L.
REV. 233, 257 (2000). Only twenty-one percent of comparison cases settled, but
researchers urged caution in interpreting this comparison because some of the
comparison cases remained at early stages. Id. at 257-58.
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Improved employee morale is another benefit. While the evaluations of
mediation do not measure this directly, satisfaction with mediation is likely to be
a good proxy. The REDRESS transformative mediation program showed that
all participants had high levels of satisfaction with the process and, to a
somewhat lesser extent, with the outcome. 237 Grievance mediation in the coal
industry also resulted in high satisfaction levels, but the grievants were less
satisfied than the company and the union. 238 Data from governmental agency
mediation programs also indicate relatively high satisfaction levels. 239 Although
not definitive, this data may suggest that the transformative model better
achieves the goal of employee morale. Also, some studies suggest that parties
in legal or court-connected mediation are less satisfied with the fairness of the
process and do not perceive themselves as having significant control over the
mediation. 240 The use of evaluative mediation may exacerbate this feeling of
lack of control because of the pressure that disclosure of legal norms may place
on the parties for a particular settlement. 241 Professor Welsh, however, argues
that it is not evaluative mediation per se that causes this feeling of lack of
control. 242 Rather, she argues that it is the timing and presentation of the
mediator's evaluation that causes dissatisfaction. 243 An evaluation that comes
later in the mediation process, following the pattern of grievance mediation, can
address this concern.

237. See supra note 215 and accompanying text. The Ohio study, although small,
also revealed high satisfaction rates. Hebert, supra note 107, at 434-36.
238. Feuille, supra note 5, at 190; Goldberg, supra note 95, at 12-13. The
grievants were more satisfied with mediation than arbitration, however. Goldberg, supra
note 95, at 13. For further discussion of grievant satisfaction, see infra note 247.
239. See McDERMOTT ET AL., supra note 110, ch. 6 (describing participant
satisfaction with EEOC mediation). Like participants in the REDRESS program, EEOC
mediation participants were somewhat more satisfied with the process than the outcome.
Id. The EEOC pilot program evaluation reported similar satisfaction levels. Id. ch. 2.
Outsiders have described the EEOC mediation process as facilitative. See Yelnosky,
supra note 116, at 602. Participants in the Massachusetts Commission Against
Discrimination ("MCAD") mediation program also had relatively high satisfaction levels,
but again, they were higher for process than outcome. Kochan et al., supra note 236, at
264-65, 274. The MCAD mediation procedure is described as a combination of
facilitative and directive. Id. at 274. Employers report employee satisfaction with
internal programs but such reports are largely anecdotal or the result of company surveys,
rather then systematic evaluation by neutral evaluators. See GAO REPORT, supra note
143,at40,48,50-5l,59, 71, 75, 79.
240. Nancy A. Welsh, Disputants' Decision Control in Court-Connected
Mediation: A Hollow Promise Without Procedural Justice, 2002 J. DJSP. RESOL. 179,
181-84.
241. Welsh, supra note 144, at 847.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 848-5 l.
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Another benefit of mediation is the opportunity for interest-based, rather
than purely rights-based, solutions. Related to this possibility is the greater
potential for resolving second-generation discrimination issues. Either form of
mediation has the potential to generate agreements based on interests. 244 If
transactional mediation includes an evaluative component, however, and the
mediator is overly focused on the legal norms and potential legal remedies or
moves to the evaluation too quickly, exploration of interest-based solutions is
likely to be short-circuited. Excessive pressure to mediate and resolve disputes
quickly might lead to such tactics.
A primary benefit cited above for incorporating noncontractual mediation
is the empowerment and inclusion of union members and connections with
outside social justice organizations. 245 Transformative mediation, with its
explicit goal of giving voice and empowerment to the parties and changing
conflictive culture, may best achieve this benefit. Nevertheless, the studies of
grievance mediation show that a carefully structured form of transactional
mediation does not preclude this benefit in a workplace where the relationships
are generally expected to be ongoing. 246 In legal or court-connected mediation,
where studies have shown that the parties feel less empowered and relationship
repairs are rare, the relationship was probably broken, perhaps irretrievably so,
before the lawsuit was filed. The explicit goal of such mediation is to settle the
case on terms based on legal rights to avoid trial. Docket clearing is an
important goal of the court, and legal norms will generally be the driving factor
in settlement. Even in grievance mediation, however, the individual grievants
demonstrated somewhat less satisfaction than union and management officials.247

244. See Bingham & Napoli, supra note 205, at 519 (describing the transfonnative
model as focusing on "interest-based negotiation techniques to help the parties engage
in creative problem solving regarding their conflict"); Goldberg & Brett, supra note 91,
at 23-24 (describing the focus on interests as one of the benefits of the grievance
mediation system which has an evaluative component); William L. Ury et al., Designing
an Effective Dispute Resolution System, 4 NEGOTIATION J. 413, 415 (1988) (discussing
the importance of focusing on interests in resolving disputes through mediation and
negotiation). But see Yelnosky, supra note 116, at 600-02 (suggesting that facilitative
mediation is better-suited to fashioning solutions to discrimination because it relieves the
parties of the need to fit issues into Title VII doctrine).
245. The small Ohio study found no difference in satisfaction with mediation
among various racial and ethnic groups or between the genders. Hebert, supra note 107,
at 435-36.
246. Elkiss, supra note 90, at 678-79; Skratek, supra note 163, at 65.
247. Employee satisfaction is more likely to be influenced by the outcome of the
mediation since employees are one-shot players in the grievance process, while union and
employer officials, who have a better sense of the merits of the grievance based on their
experience, are likely to assess satisfaction based on the overall process rather than the
outcome of a particular dispute. Jeanne M. Brett & Stephen B. Goldberg, Grievance
Mediation in the Coal Industry: A Field Experiment, 37 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 49, 63-
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Reduced employee satisfaction may be a natural result in a system where the
union, not the employee, controls the decision about settlement. In the mediation
suggested here, the union should be careful not to exert control, except to the
extent of ensuring that settlement does not conflict with the collective bargaining
agreement. The goal of empowering and including union members and their
caucuses is paramount, and should not be sacrificed to the goal of settlement.
Several other factors may be influential in the decision of which form of
mediation to adopt. Where the dispute involves employees and supervisors still
in the workforce, repair of relationships and transforming the manner of dealing
with conflict will be important to employers, unions and employees. Where the
dispute involves an employee or employees no longer employed, that goal may
be less important. 248 In the union workplace, however, it is far more common
than in the nonunion workplace for employees to return to work after
termination. Arbitrators frequently reinstate terminated employees. 249 And
evidence demonstrates that in the union workplace, unlike the nonunion
workplace, reinstatement often lasts. 250 A mediated settlement may provide
quicker reinstatement, easing the financial burden on both the employee and the
employer, which would have a greater back pay obligation if the employee was
reinstated after arbitration or litigation. Where there is clearly no desire to return
or no possibility of return, empowerment of the employee and the caucus may
still be a worthwhile goal from the union's point of view, as will education of the
supervisor. The employer's incentive for transformative mediation under these
circumstances may be limited, however.
Finally, an evaluative model may quickly become ineffective where many
of the disputes involve employees who have no meritorious legal claim.
Evaluators of the REDRESS program noted that in ninety-five percent of

64 (1983).
248. If a supervisor or manager learns a better way to deal with other employees,
however, mediation can provide value to the employer and those employees remaining
in the workforce.
249. LAURA J. COOPER ET AL., ADR IN THE WORKPLACE 300 (2000) (noting that
reinstatement is the most common remedy for unjust discharge in labor arbitration).
250. See WEILER, supra note 59, at 86 & n.72 (pointing out that seventy to eighty
percent of reinstated employees in unionized workplaces continue to work for the
employer "for an appreciable period," while reinstatement is far less successful where
there is no union); Martha S. West, The Case Against Reinstatement in Wrongful
Discharge, 1988 U. ILL. L. REV. I, 28-30, 38-39 (citing empirical studies establishing that
in the unionized workplace over eighty-five percent of employees accepted arbitral
awards of reinstatement and forty-seven to seventy-five percent of those were still
working two years later; in two studies ofreinstatement under the NLRA only forty-one
percerit and less than fifty percent of employees offered reinstatement accepted and of
those only eleven percent and thirty percent respectively were still employed there after
two years).
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discrimination cases at the Postal Service, the evaluation would favor the
employer. 251 Given that the employer established and financed the program and
trained the mediators, the authors posit that an evaluative program with such
results would have the appearance of bias and thus be unsuccessful. 252 It is
unlikely that a smaller employer would be able to quantify the validity of
discrimination claims as the Postal Service has done and thus tailor the mediation
program based on the likely validity of claims. In the absence of evidence about
the number of valid legal claims in the workplace, adoption of a mediation model
without an evaluative component avoids this concern. 253 Additionally, the
REDRESS researchers suggest that mediators in an evaluative program might
pressure the parties for settlement based on a belief that settlement is success,
which again may have the appearance of bias. 254 Where the goal is not
settlement, these risks are diminished.
To summarize, it appears that either transformative mediation or
transactional mediation can achieve the benefits described above in the unionized
workplace. 255 If transactional mediation is used, however, care must be taken to
structure the mediation to avoid undue emphasis on the length of the sessions or
the end result of settlement. In addition, if evaluation is used it should come
after other efforts to settle have failed, in order to avoid unduly driving the
discussions, limiting the options, and reducing empowerment and satisfaction.
In some cases, an employer may have a greater interest in evaluative mediation
since the primary benefit for the employer is settlement of legal claims without
litigation. The employer should be aware of the potential for decreasing future
disputes that may derive from transformative mediation, however. If an
employer insists on a more directive form of mediation, it can still provide the
necessary benefits to the union and employees if practiced as described above. 256

251. Bingham & Napoli, supra note 205, at 523.
252. Id.
253. Interjecting evaluation only after other efforts to resolve the problem have
failed, as in the grievance mediation model used by Goldberg and Brett, is another
method of addressing this concern.
254. Id. at 523-24.
255. In a study of EEO mediation cases before the Kansas Human Rights
Commission, researchers found that the participants in mediation believed that evaluative
mediation was more effective than facilitative mediation in resolving workplace rights
disputes. Vanna & Stallworth, supra note 132, at 412. The number of respondents to
the survey was small (forty-seven), and it is not clear which type of mediation was used
in the mediations in which the participants were involved. Id. at 397. The researchers
hypothesize that facilitative mediation might be more appealing at earlier stages of the
dispute before the parties have entered into the legal enforcement process, where they
might be anticipating or seeking some judgment about the case. Id. at 412.
256. In theory, there is no reason that the union and employer could not provide in
their agreement that the form of mediation would be based on the type of dispute. Such
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One option is for the parties to negotiate a trial or pilot program, both to
determine whether the suggested benefits of the program are achieved and to
evaluate which type of mediation will best fit their needs. 257 A pilot program
would require an evaluation and assessment to determine whether to extend the
program. University dispute resolution programs or the Federal Mediation
Conciliation Service ("FMCS") might provide such an assessment at reasonable
cost.25s

2. The Impact of Grievance Mediation
Despite the widely reported success of grievance mediation programs, they
are incorporated in a small percentage of collectively bargained grievance
procedures. 259 Professor Feuille has evaluated grievance mediation studies to
determine the reasons for this limited adoption. A review of his conclusions may
assist in determining whether mediation of legal claims has any future in the
unionized workplace. In evaluating grievance mediation, Professor Feuille
suggests that settlement in mediation is driven by the mediator's assessment of
the strength of the grievance and that the cooperative attitudes of the parties to
the process are a cause, rather than an effect, of mediation. 260 Thus, Feuille
argues that grievance mediation works because the parties who choose it are
motivated to settle and because the mediator's evaluation of the merits of the
grievance pressures the party predicted to lose in arbitration to accept a
settlement. 261 In essence, he contends that mediation offers little that is not
already available in the existing grievance system except a preview of the
arbitration decision. Feuille offers several explanations for the limited use of
grievance mediation. First, he points out that most grievances are settled without
arbitration, so that the additional mediation step is unnecessary. 262 Second, he

a system would work best if the parties agreed in advance which disputes would fall
under which types of mediation and selected the mediator on that basis. Otherwise, the
parties might have to resolve a dispute about the type of mediation before getting to the
substance of the dispute, reducing the benefits of the system.
257. Professor Dannin's research on two statutory mediation programs in New
Zealand demonstrates that context is an important determinant of the success of a
mediation system. See Dannin, supra note 187, at I 06. A pilot or experiment could aid
the parties in determining the most effective program for their needs.
258. See FMCS Exploring, supra note 163 (noting the FMCS initiative, Dynamic
Adaptive Dispute Systems ("DY ADS"), formed to assist parties in design and assessment
of dispute resolution systems for noncontractual disputes in the union and nonunion
workplace).
259. Feuille, supra note 5, at 197.
260. Id. at 196-97.
261. Id.
262. Id. at 198.
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posits that mediation resolves only carefully screened grievances and is
dependent on the existence of arbitration and the mediator's prediction of its
outcome. 263 Because of these facts, mediation may be most appropriate for
troubled relationships, and may be perceived as too limited in effect for the
average grievance procedure. 264 Feuille also suggests that management has little
incentive to agree to grievance mediation because almost all grievances are
challenges to management action and thus, mediation provides an additional
opportunity for the union to obtain something from the employer, often in
grievances that the union does not intend to arbitrate. 265 Finally, Professor
Feuille posits that many unions and employers may prefer, or at least be more
comfortable with, the adversarial relationships that commonly characterize the
grievance procedure and arbitration. 266
Assuming that Feuille is correct, do these factors indicate that mediation
outside the collective bargaining agreement will be similarly limited? The
reported success of grievance mediation in some collective bargaining
agreements and of the REDRESS program indicates that mediation may provide
benefits for at least some unions, employers and employees. Unlike grievance
mediation which is part of the existing grievance procedure, there is not another
vehicle to achieve settlement for noncontractual claims. 267 Thus, the mediation
procedure advocated is not merely an additional, and perhaps superfluous, step
in an already existing system. It offers something in addition that has benefits
beyond settlement of the dispute. Further, even assuming that the union and the
employer may prefer the adversarial system for their own contractual disputes,
many employers are adopting mediation programs for legal disputes involving
nonunion employees, suggesting that there are benefits to such programs. 268
Widespread management adoption of mediation procedures for nonunion

263. Id. at 199-200.
264. Id. at 200.
265. Id. at 200-0 I. Knowing that the union can afford to arbitrate a limited number
of grievances, management may prefer to force the union to undertake the costs of
arbitration or drop the grievance. Id. at 203.
266. Id. at 203-04. In addition, he suggests that mediation has no natural advocates
because those who participate in arbitration benefit from its use and have little incentive
to support a procedure that reduces arbitration. Id. at 204-05.
267. It is possible that for the legal claims a court-connected procedure might exist,
but it would not involve the union, unless it was a defendant, or identity caucuses. It is
also possible that due to overlap between contractual and noncontractual claims, a
noncontractual claim might be the subject of a contractual grievance. If, in fact, the
overlap is such that most noncontractual disputes are resolved in the contractual
grievance procedure, the mediation process advocated here would be superfluous. For
further discussion of the overlap of claims, see infra Part 11.F.
268. Feuille, supra note 5, at 205-07 (citing various studies showing frequent use
of mediation to resolve disputes in the nonunion workplace).
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employees indicates that employers are persuaded that they offer value to the
company.
If the success of grievance mediation in achieving settlement is dependent
on the existence of arbitration and the arbitration preview, mediation of legal
claims has a similar alternative, filing of a claim with an enforcement agency or
court. The suggested importance of the preview in compelling settlement would
argue for use of evaluative rather than transformative mediation, however. Also,
the preview may be a far more important factor in settlement in a situation where
experienced negotiators have already attempted and failed to settle the dispute
in the earlier grievance process. In addition, the union or the employer may use
the preview to explain to their constituencies a settlement that may be unpopular,
in order to deflect political repercussions. The union, at least, has less need to
be concerned about political ramifications in mediating claims where the claim
belongs to the individual and the rights, if any, arise not from a union-negotiated
contract, but from the law. Additional experiments with transformative,
facilitative and evaluative mediation for noncontractual claims will provide
further evidence as to the most appropriate format. The lack of widespread
adoption of grievance mediation, however, does not indicate the mediation of
noncontractual claims would not accomplish the purposes suggested here.
Previous sections have identified potential benefits of mediation of
noncontractual claims in the unionized workplace as well as some empirical
research providing cautious optimism about the potential. Nevertheless, there
are costs to providing such a program and a number of implementation issues
that must be addressed in determining whether such a system would provide
sufficient benefits to justify the costs to the parties. It is to these I now tum.

E. Costs
Negotiating a noncontractual mediation system would add some time and
cost to collective bargaining negotiations. Such cost would be minimal,
however, compared to the cost of establishing and administering the program and
providing representation for employers and employees. 269 The cost of the
program will be greater if outside mediators are used. 270 A mediation program

269. The Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service is planning to focus
increasingly on employment mediation, which may assist employers and unions in
reducing the cost of establishing a program. See FMCS Head Plans to Create Model,
Increase Efforts in Nonbargaining Situations, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 56, at C-1
(Mar. 24, 2002). The agency will create a roster of mediators for individual employment
cases, and a mediation model and training programs to help employers implement
internal mediation. Id. The agency can also direct parties to outside resources and help
evaluate mediation systems. FMCS Exploring, supra note 163.
270. If internal mediators are used, there is still a cost, however, as their time could
otherwise be used for other work from which the employer derives benefit.
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shared among several employers and/or unions, however, could reduce the
administrative cost for each organization. Such a system might enable
employees of one employer or union to mediate disputes involving different
employers or unions, minimizing the cost of the mediator. 271 Administration by
a university or nonprofit organization could reduce costs also.
To minimize any perception of bias, ideally the cost of the mediator should
be shared by either the union and the employer or the aggrieved employee and
the employer. 272 Even ifthe full cost is not shared, payment of some fee by the
employee, particularly for legal claims, increases investment in the process. 273
Any fee may decrease participation, however, and thus the union and employer
need to consider whether the process should be cost free to the employees. 274
In addition to the cost of the mediation itself, there is the cost of training
mediation advocates. 275 To successfully participate in mediation oflegal claims,

271. Some government programs have utilized mediators from different agencies
to reduce costs. See, e.g., GAO REPORT, supra note 143, at 61, 69, 77; Hebert, supra
note 107, at 418-21; Hodges, supra note 108, at 489. Use of union or management
personnel might diminish the perception of fairness, however. See supra note 108 and
accompanying text.
272. See Bingham, Employment Arbitration, supra note 32, at 215 (discussing the
importance of the perception of fairness in dispute resolution). Scholars and courts, most
debating in the context of arbitration, disagree about whether payment of the entire cost
by one party will actually affect fairness of the process. See Matthew T. Ballenger, The
Price ofJustice: The Role of Cost A/location in the Employment Arbitration Fairness
Analysis, 18 LAB. LAw. 485, 495-97 (2003). Because the union will have fewer financial
resources in most cases, imposing substantial cost on the union may remove the
incentive, or even the ability, to provide mediation for noncontractual claims.
273. See Stuart H. Bompey & Gary R. Siniscalco, The Settlement Process in
Employment Discrimination Litigation: A New Perspective, in LITIGATING EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION CASES 31 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course, Handbook Series No.
H-522, 1995)
274. See CRAIG A. MCEWEN, AN EVALUATION OF THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT
OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION'S PILOT MEDIATION PROGRAM 28 (1994) (noting that
payment of cost reduced participation in the program). The Postal Service paid the full
cost of mediation and the mediator training costs for the REDRESS program, but it
recovered some cost because each mediator was required to perform pro bono mediation
as a condition of placement on the system's roster of mediators. Gann & Hallberlin,
supra note 108, at 628.
275. Training of advocates and, ideally, even potential disputants, is important to
the success of the program. See GAO REPORT, supra note 143, at 41 (reporting that
Brown & Root found that "the effectiveness of a program is directly related to a
company's investment in training and to its frequency of communication"); Elkiss, supra
note 90, at 683 (emphasizing the importance of training advocates in mediation skills);
Hallberlin, supra note 107, at 382 (discussing the importance of training to the success
of REDRESS); Karen A. Intrater & Traci Gabhart Gann, The Lawyer's Role in
Institutionalizing ADR, 18 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 469, 470, 472-73, 474 (2001)

418

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69

representatives should have training not only in negotiation and problem
solving, 276 but also in the legal issues that will be mediated. Advocates should
be able to assess the viability of legal claims in order to advise the parties as to
equitable settlements. Even if the mediation itself does not contain an evaluative
component, 277 the acceptable settlement often will depend significantly on the
likelihood of success in litigation. 278 If the mediation process is to be effective
at improving the inclusiveness of the union, training for many potential
advocates will be required. Given the limited resources of most unions, such
training could be a substantial obstacle.
In order to minimize the cost, unions must seek opportunities for low cost
training from organizations such as universities, 279 nonprofit organizations280 and
government agencies. 281 Grants may be available for such training. The union
could also negotiate for employer-paid training. If, in fact, mediation reduces
litigation-related costs and improves productivity, employer investment in
training would be cost-effective. 282 Careful assessment of costs and benefits, use

(describing training of Postal Service attorneys in the REDRESS Program and the
establishment of a web site for complainants' attorneys); Ury et al., supra note 244, at
418 (discussing necessity of training).
276. Union representatives who have been involved in handling grievances under
the collective bargaining agreement are often focused on gathering evidence, arguing
rights and supporting positions. El kiss, supra note 90, at 686. While such skills will be
useful in mediation of legal claims, the representatives also must be able to focus on
interest-based problem solving, including creative thinking and effective communication,
which furthers collaboration. Id. at 686-87.
277. See supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text (describing the grievance
mediation process in which the mediator, who is also an experienced arbitrator, previews
for the parties the predicted outcome of arbitration).
278. Of course, the importance of this factor will depend on the issue being
mediated and the goal of the mediation. See supra notes 204-09 and accompanying text.
279. For example, the Alliance for Education in Dispute Resolution is a consortium
of academic institutions and professional organizations that provides training in dispute
resolution.
280. Union federations, such as AFL-CIO affiliates, could offer such training as
well.
28 l. The FMCS is considering implementation of a training program for
employment mediation. See FMCS Head, supra note 269, at C- l.
282. See GAO REPORT, supra note 143, at 40-41 (reporting data from Brown &
Root indicating substantial cost savings from ADR program despite costs of training and
development, as well as payment of some legal fees for employees); Zinsser, supra note
163, at 161 (reporting forty percent reduction in legal expenses at Brown & Root after
implementation of dispute resolution program). An innovative method of funding the
training necessary to spread a broad labor-management partnership throughout a large
organization was adopted by Kaiser Permanente and a coalition of unions representing
its employees. The parties established a trust fund for this purpose, financed in part by
six cents per hour from employee wages, with an escalator clause for the later years of
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of pilot projects, and location oflow cost sources of consultation, mediators and
training will help employers and unions negotiate and implement cost-effective
procedures designed for their particular needs.

F. Overlap with the Other Procedures

1. The Grievance Procedure
Most collective bargaining agreements contain provisions that coincide
with, or overlap with, legal requirements. 283 Nondiscrimination provisions are
incorporated in many collective bargaining agreements. 284 Family medical leave
provisions are also common. 285 Wages, hours, benefits, discipline and discharge
are all covered by collective bargaining agreements, as well as statutory
provisions and potential common law claims. 286 Given this overlap, why should

the agreement. See Robert B. McKersie et al., Interest-Based Negotiations at Kaiser
Permanente 11 (Apr. 2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
283. David E. Feller, The Coming End of Arbitration's Golden Age, in
PROCEEDINGS OF THE TwENTY-NINTH ANNUAL MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF
ARBITRATORS 97, 109 (Barbara D. Dennis & Gerald G. Somers eds., 1976).
284. According to a Bureau of National Affairs survey, sixty-eight percent of
collective bargaining agreements in force in 2001 and expiring in 2002 contained a
nondiscrimination provision and forty-eight percent contained a sexual harassment
policy. 2002 SOURCE BOOK ON COLLECTIVE BARGAINING: wAGES, BENEFITS AND OTHER
CONTRACT ISSUES 63 (2002). In addition, forty-one percent contained affirmative action
programs and twenty-three percent contained diversity programs. Id.
285. The BNA survey indicates that fifty-two percent of contracts contained a
pledge to comply with the FMLA. Id. In addition, seventy-eight percent had provisions
for sick leave and thirty-three percent contained provisions for personal leave. Id. at 55.
In many situations the sick leave and personal leave provisions would overlap with
FMLA leave. See also 29 U.S.C. § 2652 (2000) (addressing the effect of the FMLA on
collective bargaining agreements, providing that the agreement cannot diminish statutory
benefits but can add to them).
286. Most contracts contain provisions on wages, job security, pensions, and health
and life insurance. 2002 SOURCE BOOK, supra note 284, at 35-36, 41-42, 51-52, 59, 6768 (showing survey data on incorporation of such benefits in contracts). The Federal
Mediation and Conciliation Service conducted a study for fiscal year 1997 to determine
the breakdown of arbitration subjects. See COOPER ET AL., supra note 249, at 249. Of
the cases "[f]ifty-six percent involved discipline and discharge, 19% wages and hours,
10% seniority, 3% fringe benefits and 2% subcontracting." Id. Legal claims covering
these same subjects are also available. See Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C §§ 207219 (2000) (minimum wage and overtime pay); the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act of 1996, 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-gg-2 (2000) (health insurance benefits);
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001- 1461 (2000)
(pension and welfare benefit plans); CAL.LAB. CODE§§ 1171-1205 (West 1989 & Supp.
2003) (wages and hours of work); 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 105/1-15 (West 1999 &
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the parties add another dispute resolution procedure instead of simply resolving
all disputes through the existing collectively bargained grievance and arbitration
procedure?
Some unions and employers may effectively resolve all disputes through the
grievance and arbitration procedure. In such cases, a separate mediation
procedure might be unnecessary. Even in such situations, however, mediation
of noncontractual claims often will provide an opportunity for more union
involvement by groups who are often perceived, or perceive themselves, as
outsiders. Where people of color and white women have not historically been
active in the union, the union may not be meeting their needs effectively.
Although union officials may view their current dispute resolution procedure as
effective, that perception may not be shared by all, and the union should be
cautious about quickly reaching such a conclusion. A separate mediation
procedure that provides an opportunity to address issues such as discrimination,
harassment, leave opportunities, child care and interpersonal disputes may
enhance the union by making it more inclusive, while at the same time resolving
disputes in ways that do not fit neatly under the collective bargaining agreement.
Despite the frequent overlap between contractual and legal rights, unions
often utilize the courts and administrative agencies to address legal issues, 287 and
they direct employees to do so as well. 288 The rationales for doing so vary from
a desire not to overload the grievance and arbitration procedure to a need to

Supp. 2002)(same);MAss.ANN.LAWSch. 151, §§ l-22(Law. Co-op. l989)(same); VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 40.1-28.8-28.12 (Michie 2002) (same); Wrongful Discharge from
Employment Act, MONT.CODEANN. §§ 39-2-901-915 (2001) (providingcauseofaction
for wrongful termination); Wilson v. Monarch Paper Co., 939 F.2d 1138 (5th Cir. 1991)
(recognizing employee's claim for intentional emotional distress for demotion and other
demeaning treatment at work); Dean v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 885 F.2d 300 (5th Cir.
1989) (same); Muellerv. Union Pacific R.R., 371N.W.2d732 (Neb. 1985) (recognizing
employee's claim for fraud).
287. For examples of legal claims initiated by unions, see Int'I Union, UAW v.
Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. 187 (1991) (filing case against employer for sex
discrimination); Cleveland Newspaper Guild, Local 1 v. Plain Dealer Publ'g Co., 839
F.2d 1147 (6th Cir. 1988) (acting as plaintiff in sex discrimination case); Local Union
1888 of the Am. Fed'n of State Employees v. City of Jackson, 473 F.2d 1028 (5th Cir.
1973) (seeking declaratory judgment that defendants engaged in racial and sexual
discrimination in employment practices); and Wilmington Firefighters Local 1590 v. City
of Wilmington, 632 F. Supp. 1177 (D. Del. 1986) (suing city claiming discrimination
against nonminority firefighters). See also Fisk, supra note 71, at 63 (noting the
involvement of unions in enforcing statutory employment laws).
288. See, e.g., Wright v. Universal Mar. Servs. Corp., 525 U.S. 70, 74 (1998);
Safrit v. Cone Mills Corp., 248 F .3d 306, 307 (4th Cir. 2001 ); see also 0 'Melveny, supra
note 123, at 354 (recommending that unions encourage employees to file complaints with
the EEOC and state anti-discrimination agencies when employer does not address and
resolve sexual harassment issues).
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bring the power of the court or agency to bear in order to resolve the dispute. 289
While ultimately resolution by the courts may be required in some of these
disputes, the mediation alternative provides a means for resolving the matter
short oflitigation. To the extent that local union officials are uninterested in the
issues, trained advocates from among the union membership can pursue the
claim on behalf of the employee(s), providing representation despite the official
disinterest. 290 Some involvement from high level union officials will be
necessary, however, to ensure that any settlement reached does not conflict with
the collective bargaining agreement. 291 In most cases, incompatibility will not
be a problem. 292 Where there is potential for conflict-a broad structural change
in procedures designed to remedy a dearth of women and/or minorities in a
particular job classification, for example-the union can be involved in
negotiating the necessary changes. 293
Unions and employers should carefully consider whether the grievance and
arbitration procedure is effectively resolving both contractual and noncontractual
disputes. If mediation is, in fact, duplicative of the grievance procedure, it may
drain resources from the union and the employer that could be put to more
productive use. Where noncontractual claims are not being resolved in the
grievance and arbitration procedure, however, the mediation process can provide
benefits to unions, employers and employees. The resources invested will be
offset by settlement of claims, a more productive workforce, and, for the union
and employees, a more active and involved membership that renders the union
a better representative. In addition, the union may benefit from additional
organizational successes that result from its ability to provide services to
employees in nonunion workplaces.

289. In some cases, the union officials may simply be unconvinced of the merits
of the dispute or uninterested in the issues raised. A direction to the employee to utilize
legal means is a method of"passing the buck" to avoid expending union resources. This
may derive from a lack of sensitivity to the issues, for example, harassment or
discrimination, which is one of the problems this proposal is designed to address.
290. Pressure from international unions may encourage some local unions to
negotiate mediation procedures even when local officials see little need to do so.
291. See W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759, 461 U.S. 757, 771-72 (1983)
(enforcing arbitration award under collective bargaining agreement despite its conflict
with conciliation agreement negotiated by the EEOC and the employer to settle
discrimination claim where union was not included in conciliation and employer and
EEOC had no authority to abrogate the collective bargaining agreement).
292. For example, most agreements have generic nondiscrimination clauses that
would not be violated by any settlement. See infra notes 310-20 and accompanying text
(discussing conflicting interests).
293. Of course, where the union officials are resistant to such change, mediation
may not resolve the dispute and legal action may be required. In some cases, legal action
against the union may be included.
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2. The Procedure for Harassment Complaints
Recent Supreme Court decisions in sexual harassment cases have made
creation of a complaint procedure for harassment a significant element of an
employer's defense. 294 In cases alleging a hostile environment, the employer
may escape vicarious liability for the actions of its supervisors by establishing
a two-pronged affirmative defense:
(a) that the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct
promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and (b) that the plaintiff
employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or
corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm
otherwise. While proof that an employer had promulgated an
anti-harassment policy with complaint procedure is not necessary in
every instance as a matter oflaw, the need for a stated policy suitable
to the employment circumstances may appropriately be addressed in
any case when litigating the first element of the defense. And while
proof that an employee failed to fulfill the corresponding obligation of
reasonable care to avoid harm is not limited to showing any
unreasonable failure to use any complaint procedure provided by the
employer, a demonstration of such failure will normally suffice to
satisfy the employer's burden under the second element of the
defense. 295
Where the alleged harassment was promulgated by a co-employee, employer
liability depends on whether the employer took prompt and effective action to

294. Faragherv. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998); Burlington Indus.,
Inc., v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998).
295. El/erth, 524 U.S. at 765.
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end the harassment once it knew or reasonably should have known of it. 296 This
defense formulation also impels creation of an effective complaint procedure.
While forcing mediation on a reluctant complainant would certainly be
counterproductive, optional mediation can form a part of an effective complaint
procedure. Evidence suggests that targets of sexual harassment most often
simply want the harassment to stop. 297 Most are not interested in litigation or
damages, unless the employer is insensitive to the complaint. 298 Mediation offers
several particular advantages over litigation of sexual harassment claims. 299 The

296. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Guidelines on Discrimination,
29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(d)(2003);seealso Swenson v. Potter, 271F.3d1184, 1192 (9th Cir.
2001) (explaining that employer liability for coworker harassment arises when the
employer "'knew or should have known about the conduct'" and failed to take "prompt
corrective action that is 'reasonably calculated to end the harassment"') (quoting Ellerth,
524 U.S. at 759; Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., 256 F.3d 864, 875 (9th Cir. 2001));
Berry v. Delta Airlines, 260 F.3d 803, 812 (7th Cir. 2001) (explaining that an employer
incurs liability for coworker harassment if it "'knew or should have known"' of the
problem and failed to take "'appropriate remedial action"') (quoting McKenzie v. Ill.
Dept. ofTransp., 92 F.3d 473, 480 (7th Cir. 1996)); White v. N.H. Dep't of Corr., 221
F.3d 254, 261 (1st Cir. 2000) (stating that employer liability for coworker harassment is
triggered ifthe employer "'knew or should have known of the charged sexual harassment
and failed to implement prompt and appropriate corrective action"') (quoting
Blankenship v. Parke Care Ctrs., Inc., 123 F.3d 868, 872 (6th Cir. 1997)); Mikels v. City
of Durham, 183 F.3d 323, 332 (4th Cir. 1999) (stating that employers will be held liable
for co-employee harassment for "failing, after actual or constructive knowledge, to take
prompt and adequate action to stop it"); Kunin v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 175 F.3d 289,
293-94 (3d Cir. 1999) (explaining that if an employer knew or should have known of the
coworker harassment, it will be held liable for failing to take prompt and appropriate
measures to stop the harassment).
297. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
298. See supra note 133 and accompa.:~:::;,; =~·.d.
299. For a thorough discussion of advantages and disadvantages, see Jonathan R.
Harkavy, Privatizing Workplace Justice: The Advent ofMediation in Resolving Sexual
Harassment Disputes, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 135, 156-63 (1999). See also Reginald
Alleyne, Arbitrating Sexual Harassment Cases: A Representation Dilemma for Unions,
2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 1, 16 (1999) (suggesting multi-party mediation of sexual
harassment disputes in the unionized workplace); Joanna L. Grossman, The Culture of
Compliance: The Final Triumph of Form over Substance in Sexual Harassment Law,
26 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 3 (2003) (discussing advantages and disadvantages of mediation
of sexual harassment claims); Bond, supra note 133 (advocating mediation of sexual
harassment disputes); Rajib Chanda, Student Article, Mediating University Sexual
Assault Cases, 6 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 265 (2001) (advocating a mediation option for
sexual assault cases at universities). For a contrary view, see Mori Irvine, Mediation:
Is It Appropriate for Sexual Harassment Grievances?, 9 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 27
(1993) (rejecting mediation as an appropriate resolution forum for sexual harassment
cases). Many, but not all, of the advantages and disadvantages discussed here would also
apply to mediation of claims ofharassment on the basis of race, national origin, disability
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confidentiality of mediation allows the parties to achieve resolution without the
public revelation of what may be embarrassing details for both the victim and the
harasser.Joo Early resolution of the dispute may avoid prolonging the trauma for
the person harassed.Joi Where the harassment claim is the result of differential
views about appropriate language and conduct, mediation can educate and lead
to greater understanding. Joi Finally, mediation has the potential to empower the
target, who has more control over the process and the outcome than in
litigation. JoJ
Some sexual harassment cases would be inappropriate for mediation,
however. Public vindication might be particularly important for the accuser and
the accused where the allegations resulted from a one on one encounter
unobserved by witnesses.J 04 In cases involving repeated or serial harassment,
public litigation and liability could be essential to deter continued harassment. Jos
Finally, mediation and other informal processes may disadvantage less powerful
individuals, a concern for the harassed employee confronting the supervisor and
the employer.J06 This latter argument will be discussed in more detail in Part
11.H.
While mediation may not be appropriate for all harassment cases, or indeed,
in the view of some commentators, for any cases, it is not inconsistent with the
law of sexual harassment. Although employers must take care to ensure that
mediation is not utilized in way that discourages use of the complaint
procedure by reasonable employees,J07 offering the option may facilitate

a

or other categories.
300. Harkavy, supra note 299, at 157. A mediated settlement may avoid further
victimization that might result from a deposition or trial testimony of the complainant,
where the harasser's attorney attempts to discredit or blame her, or to explore her
psychological history to dispute her claim of damages. Id. at 158.
301. Id. at 157.
302. Id. at 160.
303. Id. at 160-61.
304. Id. at 161, 162.
305. Id. at 162, 163. Mediation of individual cases may allow resolution without
a finding as to whether the harassment occurred, and thus may permit a harasser to
continue the conduct without punishment. Kihnley, supra note 108, at 84-85. A serial
harasser may avoid discipline based on repeat violations. Id.
306. See supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text. This argument applies not
only to cases of sexual harassment but more broadly to mediation of all claims involving
the generally less powerful employee and more powerful employer. But see Kate
McCabe, A Forum for Women's Voices: Mediation Through a Feminist Jurisprudential
lens, 21 N. ILL. U. L. REv.459, 460 (2001 )(suggesting that mediation may offer a forum
for women's voices to be heard).
307. See supra note 295 and accompanying text.
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resolution of some harassment cases to the satisfaction of all involved. 308 The
union or caucus representatives can assist employees in determining which
disputes might be most appropriate for mediation, and when litigation is the more
appropriate forum. 309

G. Potential Conflicts ofInterest and the Duty of Fair Representation
One issue that may arise in a mediation procedure fornoncontractual claims
is potential conflicts of interest for the union. As posited, the procedure would
enable mediation of claims that bring employees into conflict with one another,
or employees into conflict with the union. The conflict of interest issue is much
more salient in the exclusive representation context, however. Once chosen by
a majority, the union is the exclusive representative for all employees in the
negotiation and administration of the collective bargaining agreement. 310 The
employees cannot separately negotiate with the employer, or settle grievances
without the union. 311 The union must reconcile conflicting interests of

308. An example of a situation where a cultural difference resulted in a dispute
which was resolved by mediation was offered in an article about the REDRESS program.
See Joseph P. Folger, Mediation Research: Studying Transformative Effects, 18
HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 385, 395-96 (2001). A Hispanic employee was disciplined
for leaving a meeting after his manager slammed a pile of papers on the table. Id. The
employee complained that the action hurt his ears and filed a discrimination complaint.
Id. The manager, angry at the suggestion that slamming papers could cause an injury so
severe that the employee had to leave the building, relented when the employee explained
the concept of"bad wind" from his culture, which he had been uncomfortable explaining
earlier. Id. His discomfort in explaining the bad wind, which was like a curse on you
and your family that you must escape, led him to claim that an injury caused him to leave,
rather than the bad wind from the slamming of papers. Id. As described by Folger, the
employee's revelation led to a lengthy discussion, apologies by the employee and the
supervisor, and a withdrawal of the complaint. Id.
309. Union representatives must make such recommendations based on objective
nondiscriminatory criteria. See infra notes 310-41 and accompanying text. Unions and
caucus representatives can also monitor the process to ensure that repeat offenders are
not avoiding the consequences of harassment through sequential mediated settlements.
See Kihnley, supra note 108, at 83-84; see also Crain & Matheny, supra note 53, at
1604-05 (discussing a sexual harassment case at Mitsubishi, the role of the union, and
the difficulties unions face in addressing issues of sexual harassment because of the
gendered understanding of class).
310. 29 u.s.c. § 159 (2000).
311. Id. § l 59(a) (providing that employees can present grievances to the employer
without union intervention so long as any settlement is not inconsistent with the
collective bargaining agreement and the union is given notice and an opportunity to be
present); Int') Bhd. ofElec. Workers v. Foust, 442 U.S. 42, 46 n.8 (1979) (noting union's
exclusive bargaining authority); Emporium Capwell Co. v. W. Addition Cmty. Org., 420
U.S. 50, 73 (1975) (finding discharge of employees lawful where they sought to bypass
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employees in deciding what to press for and what to settle for in negotiations,
and which grievances to pursue and which to drop. For example, if an employee
grieves denial of a promotion, the union must decide whether to support the
grievance which, if successful, would obtain the promotion for one bargaining
unit member at the expense of another who actually received the disputed
promotion. The duty of fair representation guides the union in its decisions-the
union must represent all employees in good faith, without arbitrary or
discriminatory treatment. 312 If the union violates its duty, it is liable to the
employees. 313 Thus, the union is regularly faced with decisions where it must
reconcile the conflicting interests of employees.
In one sense, the decisions are less difficult in the proposed mediation
procedure. Because the employees have one or more alternatives to mediation,
at least in the case of legal claims,314 any employee who believed that union
conflict of interest would adversely affect the procedure could decline to
participate. Also, an employee could avoid the union and choose alternative
representation, such as an attorney or a community organization. The union's
only role in such cases, assuming no claim against the union, would be to ensure
that any settlement did not violate the collective bargaining agreement.
Potential conflicts might arise, however, where the dispute involved two
employees in the bargaining unit and both sought union representation. If one
employee complained of harassment by another, for example, both might desire
union representation. Employee identity caucuses, either formed as a part of
union structure or outside it, provide the union with an option in such
situations. 315 The caucuses, where encouraged by the union to take an active role
in mediation, might have more power and influence than they would when

the union and deal directly with the employer to address issues of race discrimination);
Medo Photo Supply Corp. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 678 (1944) (holding that an employer
could not bargain directly with employees represented by union even where employees
initiated bargaining).
312. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int') v. O'Neill, 499 U.S. 65, 76-77 (1991); Vaca v.
Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 190 (1967).
313. Vaca, 386 U.S. at 195-96.
314. The employee could simply pursue the available legal remedy through the
administrative agency or court. Alternatively, ifthe action also violated the contract, the
employee could file a grievance, where the duty of fair representation would clearly
constrain the union's action. The duty of fair representation may not apply to the
mediation procedure. See infra notes 323-39 and accompanying text.
315. To allow such representation and to encourage or allow organization of
identity caucuses, the union must be open to recognizing the diversity of interests among
its members. Crain & Matheny, supra note 53, at 1611. While the modest
recommendation here does not go so far as Crain and Matheny in advocating elimination
of the law requiring exclusive representation, id. at 1614-24, it does require a lessening
of the union's grip on exclusive representation of the bargaining unit.
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formed without union support. 316 The most obvious role for caucuses formed
along the lines of gender, race and ethnicity would be representing employees
in disputes involving discrimination or benefits directly relevant to particular
groups, such as childcare or parental leave, but there is no reason that a caucus
could not represent an employee/member in other disputes as well. 317
While union and caucus representation of conflicting employee interests in
mediation has the potential for exacerbating intra-union conflicts, mediation is
a forum that provides opportunities for settling disputes and preserving
relationships. There is no dearth of conflicting interests within the union
membership in the absence of mediation. The union is simply charged, under
traditional labor law, with reconciling those conflicting interests without
discrimination or arbitrary treatment. Channeling those conflicts into mediation
offers an alternative method for dealing with the conflicts, one perhaps better
designed to resolve them.
When conflicts of interest arise in the traditional labor law context, the
union's actions are governed by the duty of fair representation. The duty of fair
representation arises from the right of exclusive representation. Because the
employee cannot escape the union's representation by dealing directly with the
employer, the duty of fair representation is necessary to avoid constitutional
issues, according to the Supreme Court's decision in Steele v. Louisville &
Nashville Railroad Co. 318 The duty compels the union to represent the employee
in good faith and without arbitrary or discriminatory treatment. 319 Thus a union's
decision to represent one employee rather than another where their interests
conflict will be tested against the requirements of the duty. For example, if an
employee complains of harassment by another employee, who is then disciplined
and files a grievance challenging that discipline under the collective bargaining
agreement, the union must decide whether to pursue the grievance. If the
union's decision is based on a good faith investigation and decision about the
merits of the grievance, it will survive challenge, even if the decision is
incorrect. 320 Even where there is no conflict of interest between members of the

316. For discussions of the effectiveness of caucuses in particular situations, see
Crain & Matheny, supra note 53, at 1617-20 (arguing for multiple representatives and
coalition building to strengthen both labor and nonlabor groups); and Yelnosky, supra
note 117, at 615-17 (detailing some specific successes, but noting that results were
mixed). Crain and Matheny, however, suggest that employees have the option of
choosing separate nonmajority representatives, which would then be free to build
coalitions among themselves. Crain & Matheny, supra note 53, at 1617-20.
317. It would be essential for the caucuses to be free to advocate for the interests
of the employees that they represent without fear of union discipline or reprisal. All
employees would have to understand the role of the caucuses.
318. 323 U.S. 192, 204 (1944).
319. See supra note 312 and accompanying text.
320. This does not mean, of course, that the employee whose interests are not

428

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69

bargaining unit or a member of the bargaining unit and the union, the duty of fair
representation applies to union actions relating to employee grievances as well
as negotiation of the collective bargaining agreement.
In the absence of conflicts of interest, concerns about adequacy of union
representation could still arise. However well-trained, union and caucus
representatives would not have the equivalent of legal training and bar
admission. Their advice to employees in mediation might miss important legal
issues and influence employees to give up legal rights in settlement
disproportionate to the strength of their claims. 321 This concern-is mitigated by
several facts. Many employees will be faced with the choice of union
representation or no representation. 322 In addition, not all lawyers will provide
effective representation. While an experienced employment lawyer might be a
better choice for a representative, a general practice attorney, however wellintentioned, might give no better representation, and perhaps worse, than a
trained union representative familiar with employment issues and the workplace.
Thus, employees as a group may be better off with union representation,
although it is possible that a few employees might be disadvantaged if they are
unaware of the strength of their case and settle for less than possible. 323 As the
procedure is contemplated, however, employees would have the option to get
legal representation. Union representatives could be trained to identify cases
where legal representation might benefit the employee and recommend retention
of an attorney in such cases. The right to retain legal representation where
desired will reduce, although not eliminate, the potential for employee
disadvantage.
One question that would certainly arise if the union and employer
negotiated a voluntary mediation procedure for noncontractual claims is whether
the duty of fair representation would apply. Application of the duty, or even
uncertainty about its application, might discourage unions from adopting such
procedures because it would create potential for liability where none existed.
There would be a strong argument, based on the origins of the duty, that it does
not apply to a procedure which is optional and allows participating employees
to decline to participate or to select any representative of their choosing. The

supported by the decision will be satisfied with the union's decision.
321. See Ellyn Moscowitz & Victor J. Van Bourg, Carve-outs and the Privatization
of Workers' Compensation in Collective Bargaining Agreements, 46 SYRACUSE L. REV.
1, 51-52 (1995) (raising concern that nonlawyer union representatives in workers'
compensation cases may fail to apprise workers of possible third party claims).
322. See supra notes 145-46 and accompanying text.
323. With respect to financial settlements, the recovery for employees with legal
representation will be reduced by the amount required to pay the attorney. Thus, even
if an employee without legal representation obtains less than the maximum potential
settlement, the net amount might be equal.
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purpose of the duty, ensuring fair representation where the employee cannot
represent himself or herself, does not require its operation in this context.
Analogous precedent supports the conclusion that the duty should not apply
where the union does not have exclusive representation rights. Several lower
courts have addressed the question of whether the duty applies in the context of
judicial appeals from arbitration decisions. 324 The most thoroughly reasoned,
and the only appellate court decision, is the Seventh Circuit's opinion in
Freeman v. Local Union No. J35, Chauffeurs, Teamsters and Helpers. 325 The
court concluded that there is no duty of fair representation where the "union does
not serve as the exclusive agent for the members of the bargaining unit with
respect to a particular rnatter."326 The court noted that where the union has an
exclusive right to represent the employee, the duty of fair representation applies
to protect the employee's rights, but where the individual is free to seek relief on
his or her own, the union has no exclusive rights. 327 Thus, because the employee
could file his own suit to vacate the arbitrator's award, the union owed him no
duty to file such a suit. 328
Once the arbitrator denied plaintiffs grievance, the rationale for the
duty of fair representation evaporated; Freeman no longer needed the
protections provided by the duty of fair representation because he had
access to extra-contractual remedies. That being the case, the union
owed plaintiff no duty in deciding whether to seek judicial review of
the committee's ruling because, with respect to that decision, it was
not acting as his exclusive representative. The union was under no

324. For other cases limiting the duty to contexts in which the union operates as
exclusive representative, see Dycus v. NLRB, 615 F.2d 820, 826 n.2 (9th Cir. 1980)
(affirming NLRB's finding that the duty does not apply to union's withdrawal as
representative since duty terminates with representation); Merk v. Jewel Food Stores
Div., 641 F. Supp. 1024, 1028-31 (N.D. Ill. 1986), aff'd, 848 F.2d 761 (7th Cir. 1988)
(finding that a union owed no duty to former employees in settling wage claims with
employer where they were no longer members of the bargaining unit and their interests
conflicted with those of current employees); Lacy v. Local 287, No. IP77-672-C, 1979
WL 2008, at *5 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 21, 1979) (finding that a union owed plaintiffs no duty
with respect to filing claim for Trade Readjustment Assistance benefits), ajf'd, 624 F.2d
1106 (7th Cir. 1980); cf Roberts v. W. Airlines, 425 F. Supp. 416, 430-31 (N.D. Cal.
1976) (finding that a union has no legal duty to file lawsuit challenging state Jaws
limiting employment of women); and Rosenfeld v. S. Pac. Co., 293 F. Supp. 1219, 1229
(C.D. Cal. 1968), ajf'd, 444 F.2d 1219 (9th Cir. 1971) (same).
325. 746 F.2d 1316 (7th Cir. 1984).
326. Id. at 1321.
327. Id.
328. Id.
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duty to provide Freeman with more legal assistance than bargained for
in the contract or required by law. 329
Additionally, the court reasoned that a decision that the duty of fair
representation applied would cause more appeals of arbitrator's decisions,
thereby undermining the finality of arbitral awards; this would be inconsistent
with federal labor policy. 330
In the mediation procedure advocated here, the employees would have the
right to file their own claims or to ignore the procedure altogether and go directly
to the appropriate administrative agency or court. Thus, no duty of fair
representation is necessary. While the union might owe the employees a duty
with respect to negotiation of the procedure,331 implementation of the procedure
would be outside the scope of the duty.
There are various arguments for distinguishing the cases finding no duty of
fair representation, however. Most of the cases in which courts declined to find
a duty involved employee attempts to evade the statute of limitations bar for
filing their own claims. 332 In addition, the labor policy supporting the finality of
arbitration militated in favor of finding no union duty to appeal unfavorable
arbitration decisions. If the union negotiates a procedure in which it offers
representation to at least some members of a bargaining unit, perhaps the duty

329. Id. at 1321-22; see Steffens v. Bhd. of Ry. & Airline Clerks, 797 F.2d 442,
447 (7th Cir. 1986); Searv. Cadillac Auto. Co. of Boston, 501 F. Supp. 1350, 1359 (D.
Mass. 1980), ajf'd on other grounds, 654 F.2d4, 7 (lst Cir. 198l)(decliningto find that
failure to appeal could never breach the duty, but suggesting that that the courts should
permit such actions "if at all, only in unusual instances where unfairness is blatant"). But
see Local 1902 v. Safety Cabs, Inc., 414 F. Supp. 64, 66 (M.D. Fla. 1976)(implyingsuch
a duty).
330. Freeman, 746 F.2d at 1322.
33 l. See Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'! v. O'Neill, 499 U.S. 65, 77 (1991). So long
as the procedure is voluntary and open to all employees, there is little risk of a claim for
breach of the duty related to negotiation of the procedure. While the union might make
some concession to management to obtain the procedure, given the benefits for the
employer, great sacrifice of employee benefits is unlikely to be necessary. In any event,
the union has great flexibility in deciding what trade-offs to make in bargaining. Id. at
78.
332. See, e.g., Steffens, 797 F.2d at447; Freeman, 746 F.2d at 1322; Lacyv. Local
287, No. IP77-672-C, 1979 WL 2008, at *12, aff'd, 624 F.2d 1106 (7th Cir. 1980).
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of fair representation should apply. 333 In its absence, what is to hold the union
accountable to the employees that it represents?
As a democratically elected representative of the employees, the union can
be decertified if a majority of the employees are dissatisfied with its
representation. Opportunities for decertification are limited, however, to
petitions filed during a thirty day period every three years unless the union is
unable to negotiate a replacement collective bargaining agreement, in which case
a petition can be filed after contract expiration. 334 Additionally, the LandrumGriffin Act requires regularly conducted elections for union officers, which
provide an opportunity to replace unsatisfactory officers. 335 The threat ofloss of
representation rights and loss of union office provides an incentive to union
officials to represent employees fairly. The ability to remove the union or its
officers, however, is little consolation to the employee who loses a job as a result
of unfair representation. Discrimination law provides a potential cause of action
for employees injured as a result of the union's discrimination on the basis of
race, gender, religion, national origin, age or disability. 336 This cause of action
would not cover every instance of possible injury to employees, however. For
example, a union official might pressure an employee to accept an unfavorable
settlement in a strong case for improper but not discriminatory reasons, such as
a promise of favorable treatment from the employer in another case more
important to the union, or even a financial payment to the official. In a less
egregious case, inadequate representation might lead an employee to a settlement
later regretted. While such conduct might be rare, the absence of the constraints
of the duty of fair representation might not discourage the temptation.
Application of the duty, however, might discourage the union from creating a
procedure that adds to its potential liability.

333. For arguments for a broader union duty, see Crain & Matheny, supra note 2,
at 1840-41 (urging imposition of an affirmative legal duty on unions to combat
discrimination in the workplace); Alan Hyde, Economic Labor Law v. Political Labor
Relations: Dilemmas for Liberal Legalism, 60 TEX L. REV. l, 29 n.74 (1981) (arguing
that the dutyoffairrepresentation should apply to any representational function the union
performs, whether mandatory or voluntary).
334. Gen. Cable Corp., 139 N.L.R.B. 1123, 1125 (1962).
335. Labor-Management Reporting & Disclosure Act, Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat.
519 (1959) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2000)).
336. 29 U.S.C. § 623(c) (2000) (providing that it is unlawful for a labor
organization to discriminate against any employee on the basis of age); 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-2(c) (2000) (providing that it is unlawful for any labor organization to discriminate
against an individual because of race, color, religion, sex or national origin); 42 U.S.C.
§§ 12111-12112 (2000) (providing that no covered entity shall discriminate against an
individual with a disability and defining "covered entity" to include labor organizations).
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Although the wide range of reasonableness accorded to the union under the
duty of fair representation337 makes imposition of liability a relatively rare
occurrence, the cost of defending even unsuccessful claims is not insubstantial.
The concern about costs encourages unions to take great care in exercising their
representational duties. One might argue that applying the duty of fair
representation to a voluntary mediation procedure in the context of egregious
union misconduct would be appropriate. On the other hand, the union should
have the freedom to decide how best to deploy its limited resources. For
example, the union should be able to choose to represent some employees, but
not all, in mediation procedures, without fear of lawsuits for breach of the fair
representation duty. In addition, the union must be able to advocate for the
interests of the bargaining unit by either resisting settlements that violate the
collective bargaining agreement or agreeing to modify the agreement where
deemed appropriate, without fear of legal challenge. The duty of fair
representation, with its wide range of reasonableness, may be a better standard
for evaluating union conduct in mediation than other possible claims such as
negligence in the performance of a duty or legal malpractice, which would be
preempted by the duty of fair representation where it applies. 338
While there is no certainty that unions would escape liability for any action
taken in the procedure advocated here, ultimately, if unions are to flourish again,
they must find a way to appeal to a broader sector of employees and to overcome
the employees' fear of selecting union representation. Although negotiation of
a mediation procedure may bring with it some risk ofliability, either through the
duty of fair representation, discrimination law or other legal action, unions must
take some risk in order to grow. The potential benefits for members and the
union may outweigh the liability risk of this voluntary procedure. 339 Indeed, the
mediation procedure might provide a vehicle for resolution of duty of fair
representation or other claims filed against the union. 340 Mediation might save

337. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'! v. O'Neill, 499 U.S. 65, 78 (1991).
338. See United Steelworkers v. Rawson, 495 U.S. 362, 371 (1990); Moscowitz
& Van Bourg, supra note 321, at 51-52 (discussing cases where plaintiffs failed in efforts
to hold nonlawyer union representatives liable for legal malpractice).
339. It is worth noting that postal employees reported high levels of satisfaction
with the fairness of a similar mediation process, whether they were represented by the
union, by another representative or had no representation. See supra notes 181-84 and
accompanying text. Thus the likelihood of claims against the union might be small.
Notably, in the coal industry grievance mediation study no duty of fair representation
suits were initiated by employees whose grievances were not arbitrated after mediation.
Elkiss, supra note 90, at 679.
340. Mediation could be a step in the union's procedure for employees' internal
appeals from union decisions not to pursue grievances. While such a procedure is
typically a part of the union's constitution and bylaws, the union cannot require
exhaustion of such a procedure prior to a lawsuit for duty of fair representation unless the
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the union legal costs in defending such claims and ultimately result in employees
gaining a better understanding of the union's decisions and the constraints upon
those decision and the union's resources. 341
The mediation procedure might provide a defense in cases seeking to hold
the union liable for hostile environment sexual harassment as well. 342 As noted
above, the Supreme Court has held that an employer can avoid vicarious liability
for supervisory sexual harassment if it can establish that it "exercised reasonable
care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and ...
that the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any
preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm

appeals procedure can provide complete relief to the employee. See Clayton v. Int'l
Union, UAW, 451 U.S. 679, 692 (1981 ). In order to provide for such relief, the union
would need to negotiate an agreement with the employer to allow reactivation of
grievances or otherwise to enable complete relief if agreed to in a mediated settlement.
341. As in all cases, the employee must be free to choose any representative
desired. The potential conflict of interest in union representation is quite clear here.
342. Unions may be liable for harassment under Title VII if the union officials
actively engage in harassment or ifthe union deliberately acquiesces in an employer's
harassment. See, e.g., Agosto v. Correctional Officers Benevolent Ass'n, 107 F. Supp.
2d 294, 308-09 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (denying motion for summary judgment based on
genuine issue of material fact as to whether the union not only failed to assist plaintiff
in her complaints about harassment but also participated in creating the hostile work
environment); Raineyv. Town of Warren, 80 F. Supp. 2d5, 18-19(D.R.I. 2000)(denying
union's motion for summary judgment based on genuine issue of material fact as to
whether the union deliberately acquiesced in the employer's harassment by failing to file
grievances despite knowledge of the severe and ongoing harassment); EEOC v. Regency
Architectural Metals Corp., 896 F. Supp. 260, 269 (D. Conn. 1995) (finding union liable
for intentionally failing to pursue female employee's hostile environment complaint to
cater to the prejudices of the majority of the union's membership), aff'd sub nom., EEOC
v. Shopmen's Local 832, No. 96-6039, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 9570 (2d Cir. Apr. 29,
1997); Stairv. Lehigh Valley Carpenters Local Union No. 600, No. 91-1507, 1993 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 8668, at •80-81 (E.D. Pa. June 29, 1993) (finding union liable for sexual
harassment where it distributed pornographic calendars with the union's name, address
and logo to members and employers, who posted them in the work sites), affd, 43 F.3d
1463 (3d Cir. 1994). The union may also be liable for breaching the duty of fair
representation where it intentionally fails to pursue harassment grievances. See Woods
v. Graphic Communications Union Local 747, 925 F.2d 1195 (9th Cir. 1991) (finding
union liable for breach of duty of fair representation for deliberately refusing to pursue
racial harassment grievances). State anti-discrimination Jaw may impose an even higher
duty on the union. See Epstein v. Sonoma County Org. of Public/Private Employees, No.
C-90-3514, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6216, at •12 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 28, 1992) (denying
union's summary judgment motion because there was a genuine issue of material fact as
to whether the union violated the California Fair Employment and Housing Act, which
placed an affirmative duty on unions "to take all reasonable steps necessary to prevent
discrimination and harassment from occurring").
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otherwise."343 The primary method of meeting this defense is the existence of
an effective complaint procedure that the employee unreasonably fails to
utilize. 344 A strong union policy against harassment, combined with a mediation
procedure for disputes between employees and the union which allows
employees to choose their own representative, may meet the first prong of the
defense. The presence of active and effective caucuses for minority groups
within the union may further help to convince courts that the procedure is
sufficiently effective that an employee who fails to utilize the procedure is acting
unreasonably. If the procedure operates to limit harassment lawsuits against the
union, the union will obtain both financial and reputational benefits.

H. Issues of Power
Issues of power predominate in the workplace and the law of the workplace.
The National Labor Relations Act was designed to allow employees to combine
their power to better combat the power of employers. 345 Unions do provide a
counterweight to employer power, but even in their heyday unions did not
eliminate power imbalances between workers and employers. 346 Today, when
unions represent 13.5 percent of the nonagricultural workforce, their power is
greatly diminished. Employees without unique skills are even less powerful,
particularly in slack labor markets. And, as a general rule, white female
employees and employees of color have even less power.
Critics of ADR in general suggest that individuals with less power are better
off in the court system, with its due process protections and formal mechanisms
for equal treatment oflitigants, than in more informal systems like mediation. 347

343. Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998). Several courts have
suggested that the same principles of assessing liability for the actions of officials should
apply to the employer and the union. See Woods, 925 F.2d at 1201;Agosto, 107 F. Supp.
2d at 307-08. •
344. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765.
345. 29 u.s.c. § 151 (2000).
346. This is not to suggest that in a given situation a union, or even an individual
employee, may not have more power than an employer, but such situations are
uncommon.
347. See Richard Abel, Jnformalism: A Tactical Equivalent to Law?, 19
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 375, 383 (1985); Delgado et al., supra note 39, at 1398-99;
William H. Simon, Legal Informality and Redistributive Politics, 19 CLEARINGHOUSE
REV. 384, 385 (1985). This argument would not apply to mediation systems that do not
include legal claims. However, one of the incentives for the employer to agree to such
a system is the potential cost savings resulting from settlement of legal claims. An
employer is less likely to create a system that incorporates only noncontractual, nonlegal
disputes unless it is convinced that mediation of such disputes will substantially raise
morale and productivity, as it gives employees a forum for claims where none previously
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If this is true, mediation may disadvantage more employees than it helps. Critics
suggest that formal mechanisms reduce the chance that bias will affect the legal
process. 348
One answer to this concern is that the suggested procedure is optional.
Employees who view the court system as a better option can decline mediation.
Some employees, however, may be convinced by the employer to participate in
mediation to their detriment. Free representation by unions, caucuses or
community groups will help balance power in mediation. Caucus representatives
and social justice organizations should be particularly sensitive to bias issues and
can help control bias in mediation. Attorney representation can also add balance,
albeit at a substantial cost. The training and experience of these representatives
diminishes the possibility that the employee will be disadvantaged. Moreover,
the legal system is no panacea. If the employee cannot afford effective legal
representation, any benefit from the legal system is limited, if not nonexistent. 349

existed with little corresponding benefit to the employer.
348. Delgado et al., supra note 39, at 1398-99; Grillo, supra note 40, at 1588-90.
Additionally, there is some evidence that mediation is more likely to result in agreement
when the parties are ofrelatively equal power. See Kenneth Kresse) & Dean G. Pruitt,
Conclusion: A Research Perspective on the Mediation ofSocial Conflict, in MEDIATION
RESEARCH: THE PROCESS AND EFFECTIVENESS OFTHIRD-PARTY INTERVENTION 394, 40405 (Kenneth Kresse) et al. eds., 1989). A study of six hundred cases in small claims court
in New Mexico evaluated outcomes of cases assigned randomly to mediation and
adjudication. The results revealed that women fared better in mediation than in
adjudication, although their subjective evaluation of mediation was more negative than
their evaluation of adjudication. Minorities, who were predominantly Hispanic, fared
worse in mediation than in adjudication and also fared worse in mediation than whites.
The differences in mediation outcomes disappeared when both mediators were mediators
of color, however. Despite their objective monetary disadvantage, minority disputants
were more enthusiastic about mediation than white disputants. James Alfini et al., What
Happens When Mediation Is Institutionalized?: To the Parties, Practitioners, and Host
Institutions, 9 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 307, 316-17 (1994) (comments of Michele
Hermann). One explanation of these differences may be that the parties are more
interested in process than outcome. Id. at 322 (comments of Robert Baruch Bush). It is
possible that parties may be both empowered and disadvantaged by mediation. A party
may be empowered (or feel empowered) by the process, yet objectively receive less relief
than he or she would have received in litigation. Hodges, supra note I 08, at 462 n.185.
Definitions of empowerment may vary as well. Craig A. McEwen, Note on Mediation
Research, in DISPUTE REsOLUTION 155, 156 (Stephen B. Goldberg et al. eds., 2d ed.
1992). In one view empowerment may come only from legal advocacy, while in another
it may come from more direct involvement in the dispute and its resolution. Id.
349. SUSAN E. LAWRENCE, THE POOR IN COURT: THE LEGAL SERVICES PROGRAM
AND SUPREME COURT DECISION MAKING, at ix ( 1990) (noting in her preface that "the
ability to retain and compensate an attorney is, effectively, a prerequisite to participation
in judicial decision making"); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, In Pursuit of the Public Good:
Access to Justice in the United States, 7 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y I, 2 (2001) ("It remains
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Simply put, power imbalances will always affect resolution of disputes in the
workplace. At best, their role can be minimized.
Another power concern is that the more powerful employer might use the
mediation process solely for the purpose of obtaining discovery for later
litigation. 350 The employee, of course, could also use mediation for this purpose.
There is widespread agreement that confidentiality is crucial for mediation to be
successful, particularly where legal claims are involved that may be (or are) the
subject of litigation. 351 Preserving confidentiality, and the perception of
confidentiality, is an issue for every mediation procedure. Trained and
experienced mediators are well aware of the importance of confidentiality and
careful mediator selection will help alleviate this concern. The mediator's
selective use of caucuses during the mediation procedure will assist in
maintenance of confidentiality as well. State and federal laws control
confidentiality in court proceedings and while the results are not always
predictable, as mediation grows predictability will grow as well. 352 Additionally

true, however, that the poor, and even the middle class, encounter financial impediments
to a day in court. They do not enjoy the secure access available to those with full purses
or political muscle."); Robert A. Katzmann, Themes in Context, in THE LAW FIRM AND
THE PUBLIC GOOD 2 (Robert A. Katzmann ed., 1995) (noting that the legal needs of the
poor are often unmet); Esther F. Lardent, Mandatory Pro Bono in Civil Cases: The
Wrong Answer to the Right Question, 49 Mo. L. REV. 78, 86 (1990) (noting that several
studies have demonstrated the extent to which the legal needs of the poor are unmet);
Monica L. Warmbrod, Comment, Could an Attorney Face Disciplinary Actions or Even
Legal Malpractice Liability for Failure to Inform Clients of Alternative Dispute
Resolution?, 27 CUMB. L. REV. 791, 800 n.76, 801 (1996-97) (noting that parties with
fewer economic resources do not face a "level playing field" in the courtroom); see also
sources cited supra note 48 (discussing various studies demonstrating that representation
increases odds of prevailing in unemployment compensation and arbitration
proceedings).
350. Harkavy, supra note 299, at 162.
351. Ellen E. Deason, Predictable Mediation Confidentiality in the U.S. Federal
System, 17 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 239, 243-45 (2002) [hereinafter Deason,
Predictable Mediation]. The Uniform Mediation Act, which was recently adopted by the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the ABA House of
Delegates, contains significant confidentiality protections. Ellen E. Deason, Uniform
Mediation Act: Law Ensures Confidentiality, Neutrality of Process, 8 DISP. RESOL.
MAG., Summer 2002, at 7. The Act has been adopted in Nebraska and introduced into
other state legislatures, but not yet adopted. See http://www.nccusl.org/nccusl/pubndra
fts.asp (last visited Apr. 15, 2004). The Act is available online at http://www.law.upenn.
edu/bll/ulc/mediat/UMA2001.htrn (last visited Feb. 12, 2004).
352. For a thorough discussion of confidentiality issues, see Deason, Predictable
Mediation, supra note 351, and Ellen E. Deason, The Quest for Uniformity in Mediation
Confidentiality: Foolish Consistency or Crucial Predictability?, 85 MARQ. L. REV. 79
(2001).
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the parties can craft confidentiality rules in negotiating the procedure, improving
predictability and controlling disclosure. 353
It has been suggested that confidentiality is of particular concern in
mediation programs in unionized environments because of the union's statutory
right to be present at the settlement of grievances. 354 The statutory right is
subject to waiver, however. 355 Further, the right may apply only to contractual
grievances, not to individual legal disputes outside the collective bargaining
agreement. 356 Nevertheless, both the union and the employer have an interest in
ensuring that settlements do not conflict with the collective bargaining
agreement. 357 To preserve both this interest and the benefits of mediation, the
parties must structure the mediation system so that employees can choose their
own representatives, eschewing union participation if they so desire, while
retaining the union's right to review settlements that may conflict with the
collective bargaining agreement. While confidentiality is an important aspect of
mediation, union involvement in settlements that necessitate changes in the
collective bargaining agreement will enhance the parties' ability to deal with
structural discrimination issues. 358 Thus, the system must be negotiated to
balance these interests to better serve all parties and accomplish the goals of the
program.

I. Statute ofLimitations Issues for Legal Claims
Finally, any mediation program covering legal claims must address the
statute oflirnitations. The most common legal issues arising out of employment,
such as discrimination claims, have a relatively short statute of limitations. For
example, under Title VII, an employee must file a charge with the EEOC within

353. Deason, Predictable Mediation, supra note 351, at 303-08; Goldberg & Brett,
supra note 91, at 24-25 (describing grievance mediation procedure which precludes use
of anything done or said at mediation in subsequent arbitration of the dispute).
354.
Stacia Marie Jones, Note & Comment, Confidentiality

in
Discrimination-Related Dispute Mediation: Is There a Congressional Mandate for
Union Employees to Have an Individual Right to Pursue Mediation Without Union
Representation?, 15 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 483, 487-88 (2000) (citing 29 U.S.C.
§ 159(a) (2000)).
355. See Bethlehem Steel Co., Shipbuilding Div., 89 N.L.R.B. 341, 345 (1950).
356. See U.S. Postal Serv., 281 N.L.R.B. 1015, 1018 (1986) (finding that union
had right to be present at settlement of EEO disputes where the employees had also filed
contractual grievances over the same issue, but making no finding about the right to be
present at meetings relating to EEO disputes where no overlapping contractual grievance
was filed).
357. See supra note 291 and accompanying text.
358. See supra note 293 and accompanying text.
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180 or three hundred days of the occurrence of the unlawful conduct. 359
Mediation must not cause the employee to lose a claim for failure to file a timely
charge or lawsuit. At the same time, some of the advantage of mediation would
be lost if the parties had to participate in formal agency or court proceedings
pending mediation. 360 In negotiation and implementation of the procedure, the
employer and the union must be aware of statutes of limitations. Generally, the
statute of limitations is not tolled during use of an internal dispute resolution
program. 361 The employer and the union could agree, as part of the program,
however, to waive the statute oflimitations defense for mediated claims. 362 Such
an agreement will be effective where compliance with the statute oflimitations
is not a jurisdictional bar. 363 An alternative is to file the claim and ask the court
or agency to delay investigation or litigation pending mediation. This alternative
depends on the agreement of nonparties, which may not always be forthcoming.
Regardless of which alternative is chosen, union and caucus representatives, as
well as employees, must be educated about the statutes oflimitations for various
claims to avoid loss of claims for failure to make a timely filing. In addition, the
mediation program should be designed to ensure prompt mediation of claims.
Failure to do so eliminates some major advantages of an ADR program.

J. Summary
A mediation program negotiated in accordance with the principles set forth
here offers potential to resolve noncontractual disputes in the unionized
workplace. Employers and employees will benefit. In addition, the procedure

359. See Nat') R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 105 (2002).
360. In some cases, mediation of a legal claim might be more successful after some
discovery of the facts as each party would have a better sense of the viability of the claim.
See CHRISTOPHER W. MOORE, THE MEDIATION PROCESS 57-58 (2d ed. 1986). Quick
settlement before positions harden and relationships are more seriously disrupted,
however, also has its advantages.
36 l. See Int') Union ofEJec. Workers v. Robbins & Myers, Inc., 429 U.S. 229, 236
(I 976). The exception is when an employer fraudulently induces a plaintiff not to file
a claim. See, e.g., Sharp v. United Air Lines, Inc., 236 F.3d 368, 372-73 (7th Cir. 2001);
Lever v. Northwestern Univ., 979 F.2d 552, 555-56 (7th Cir. 1992).
362. See Supinski v. Merrill Lynch & Co., No. OOCV7363, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
11953, at* 7-8 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2001) (finding that Merrill Lynch agreed in its
dispute resolution program to tolling of the statute oflimitations so long as the employee
filed a claim for mediation within the statute of limitations). To avoid the problems of
faded memories and lost witnesses that the statute oflimitations is designed to address,
the program, like the Merrill Lynch program, could require filing a request for mediation
prior to the expiration of the statute oflimitations.
363. See Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 393 (1982) (finding
that filing a charge of discrimination with the EEOC under Title VII is not a jurisdictional
prerequisite for a lawsuit but rather is subject to waiver, estoppel and tolling).
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provides an opportunity for the union to actively engage individual members
who have traditionally been considered outsiders. Mediation also offers an
additional avenue for cooperation between unions and social justice
organizations. Mediation, done right, can be a step on the road to union
revitalization.

ill. CONCLUSION
Transformation of the system of American industrial relations and
revitalization of labor unions or other organizations for employee voice in the
workplace will be a lengthy process, characterized by progression and
regression. The academic debate has contributed much valuable insight into the
possibilities for such transformation.
A mediation program for the
noncontractual claims of unionized employees could provide a mechanism for
effective employee voice, while at the same time providing sufficient benefits to
employers to make the program an attractive option. Experiments with such
mediation could reveal whether the projected benefits become a reality. Unions
and employers should begin such experimentation. Small steps may lead to more
substantial changes which make the system of industrial relations more
responsive to the realities of today's workplace, better serving the needs of both
employers and employees.

